Corporate Medicine Marches On - Putting Revenue Ahead of Patients

The ongoing transformation of physicians from independent professionals to corporate employees has attracted considerable recent media attention.

The Ranks of Corporate Physicians Grow

Several articles noted examples of the rush to corporate medicine.  In early November, Anna Wilde Matthews wrote in the Wall Street Journal about the push by for-profit health insurer/ managed care organization/ hospital chain Humana to hire more physicians to provide direct patient care. 

The insurer said Monday it is spending around $500 million in cash—or $850 million including debt—to acquire Metropolitan Health Networks Inc, a Boca Raton, Fla., company that operates health-care-provider networks serving people on Medicare, Medicaid and other plans. 

Also,

Humana also said its Concentra unit had acquired 55 primary-care practices in 2012.
Between direct employment, owning stakes in practices, or close contracting that also involves providing services to the doctors, Humana said it had close ties with around 2,300 physicians, and it planned to add 300 to 400 next year.

An article in Bloomberg in mid-November noted how several large for-profit hospital chains were seeking to hire physicians to provide direct patient care.

This year, HCA increased the number of doctors it employs through acquisitions and direct hiring by about 150 to 200 for a total of 3,200, said Samuel Hazen, president of operations for HCA, on a conference call Nov. 1 with analysts. The Nashville, Tennessee-based company plans to continue expanding the number of doctors it employs, though at a slower pace than over the past several years, he said.

Tenet spokesman Rick Black said acquiring physician practices is part of the company’s effort to 'ensure our hospitals provide the medical services needed by the communities they serve, and to foster the development of ongoing clinical initiatives that improve the quality of care that is delivered to patients and control costs.' He declined to comment on how many physicians Dallas-based Tenet has added through acquisitions.

Focusing on cardiology, the article highlighted a larger trend,

In Wisconsin, the number of heart doctors in private practice has declined to 11 percent from 62 percent of cardiologists in 2007, according to the American College of Cardiology, whose main offices are in Washington.  The trend is similar nationwide. The number of heart doctors working for U.S. hospitals has more than tripled, while the number in private practice has fallen 23 percent over five years, the ACC said. 

An article in the American Medical News provided the big picture,

Only 36% of practicing physicians will hold a practice ownership stake by the end of the 2013, down from 57% in 2000, according to Accenture’s analysis of data from the American Medical Association and MGMA-ACMPE.

These and several other articles began to describe the adverse effects of having physicians employed by corporations to take care of patients.  

Excess Costs

The Bloomberg article noted that the rush to employ physicians is

creating a new dynamic that threatens to raise the price of health care, even as the federal government and states strain to keep a lid on costs.

Under Medicare’s tangled payment system, hospitals get higher reimbursements than individual doctors for cardiology treatment, as they do for other specialty services, in some cases as much as three times more. At the same time, the added bargaining power gained by controlling more of the heart care in a geographic market has given large hospital systems added leverage in negotiating reimbursements from insurers, such as UnitedHealth Group Inc and WellPoint Inc.

'Clearly, in the short run, it raises costs,' said Paul Ginsburg, president of the Center for Studying Health System Change, a Washington-based nonprofit research group. 'We have a case where a physician becomes employed by a hospital and now a payer, like Medicare, has to start paying more.'

Specifically,

Medicare, the U.S. government’s health program for the elderly and disabled, pays a hospital $400 for an echocardiogram, $180 for a cardiac stress test and more than $25 for an electrocardiogram, according to data from the American College of Cardiology. At a private physicians office, Medicare pays $150 for an echocardiogram, about $60 for a cardiac stress test and $10 for an electrocardiogram.

Doctors Pressured to Put Revenue Ahead of Patients' Welfare

A far more serious concern is that physicians who are now reporting to corporate executives will be pushed to actions that increase corporate revenue even if they put patients at risk.  The Bloomberg article noted,

While they may gain more stable incomes, doctors often have less freedom over how they care for their patients under strict hospital protocols. Some doctors are also under pressure to see more patients each day when they are employed by a hospital, ...

Two major examples of investigative journalism provided concrete examples of employed physicians enticed with incentives for making decisions that put revenue ahead of patients' interests, or threatened for doing the opposite.  An article in the New York Times provided these examples

Bonuses for Early, Possibly Premature Discharge

One Florida primary care physician said he could earn a $5,000 bonus for keeping patients in the hospital for less than three days, according to a lawsuit he filed this year. Hospitals, which are typically reimbursed a fixed amount of money for treating a specific illness, can make more money if patients stay for shorter periods of time.

Bonuses for Ordering Possibly Unnecessary Tests

Last month, the Justice Department reached a $9.3 million settlement with Freeman Health System, a hospital group in Joplin, Mo., which was rewarding doctors it employed partly based on how many tests they ordered. 

Pressure to Refer Patients Only to Other Physicians Employed by the Same Corporation
 

Other physicians say they are pushed to ignore what is best for patients by referring them to doctors working for the same hospital. Dr. Victoria Rentel, a family practice doctor near Columbus, Ohio, recalled feeling pressured when she was employed by a local hospital to send her patients to doctors there for tests and procedures.

'I routinely got reports about the money I kept in the system,' Dr. Rentel said, detailing how much revenue she was generating for the hospital through in-house referrals.

Also,

In Boise, doctors are pressured to refer only within their own system, according to St. Alphonsus in its complaint. It reported a 90 percent drop in admissions to its hospitals by physicians employed by St. Luke’s.

Incentives for Possibly Unnecessary Admissions

The Times article provided evidence that physicians were pressured to admit patients regardless of need,

Health Management Associates, a for-profit hospital chain; EmCare, a Dallas-based emergency room staffing company for hospitals; and other hospitals have disclosed that they are the subjects of federal investigations. Regulators are looking into whether the hospitals improperly pressured physicians to admit patients.
 

According to two emergency room doctors who worked at Carlisle Regional Medical Center in Pennsylvania, the message could not have been clearer: more patients needed to be admitted. 

The doctors were employed by EmCare, whose parent company was later acquired by the private equity firm Clayton, Dubilier & Rice in 2011 as part of a $3.2 billion deal. EmCare, in turn, was under contract to provide emergency room doctors for the hospital, which is owned by Health Management Associates. In interviews, doctors said that hospital administrators created targets for how many patients they should admit. More admissions translated into more dollars for the hospital. 

Dr. Jean-Paul Romes, one of the physicians, recalled getting phone calls in the middle of the night questioning why he had not admitted an older patient whose hospitalization he could easily have justified. 'The pressure to admit was so high,' he said. Dr. Romes left the hospital last year.

How Incentives for Unnecessary Admissions are Disguised

A major report on the famous muck-raking CBS television program 60 Minutes provided more detail about how Health Management Associates prettied up apparent demands to increase hospital admissions, no matter what.  The reporting was based on interviews with "more than 100 current and former employees," and featured an on air discussion with three former HMA physicians and one former HMA administrator, a video clip of a deposition by a former HMA executive vice president, and an interview with a former director of compliance with HMA.

All asserted that HMA pressured physicians to increase admissions to an arbitrary proportion of emergency department patients, at times between 16 ad 20 percent.   Several alleged that physicians who failed to meet that "benchmark" were threatened with termination of their jobs.  For example,

[Dr] Cliff Cloonan: My department chief said, we will admit 20 percent of our patients or somebody's going to get fired.

A former executive vice president of HMA contended that the admission quotas came from the very top of corporate leadership.

In August, a former executive vice president of the hospital chain - John Vollmer - testified under oath in a deposition, that HMA's aggressive admission policies came directly from the top: CEO Gary Newsome.

[John Vollmer: Mr. Newsome's thought was that an average of 16 percent was accomplishable at all hospitals or more and we should seek to do that and make that happen.]

Vollmer, who was also fired by HMA, became angry when the company lawyers challenged him.

[John Vollmer: I did my duty by informing HMA that what they are doing is wrong. You can't require them all to have 16 percent admission rates and beat up doctors and administrators and all these folks over it when you are doing it to increase your revenue for the facility.
HMA attorney: I'm going to move to strike what you just said.]

By using such a benchmark, the hospital executives seemed to be trying to maintain "plausible deniability" that they meddled in individual treatment decisions.  No one accused executives of directing the admission of a specific patient.  However, there seems to have been no way for a doctor to achieve the "benchmark" without unnecessary admissions.

[CBS Correspondent] Steve Kroft: They're saying, 'You will admit these people whether they're sick or not, whether they need to be hospitalized?'
[Dr] Scott Rankin: Correct--
[Dr] Cliff Cloonan: They never phrase it that way. They did say admit 20 percent. The reality of that is that there's only one way that that can happen. And that is if it is arbitrary. That is, if you do admit patients that don't need to be admitted.

Furthermore, the hospital corporation seemed to disguise the admission imperative as part of quality assurance.  This supposed quality assurance was administered through commercial health care information technology, "corporate wide computer software called Pro-MED which was installed in every emergency room. HMA says it was designed and approved by medical experts to improve the quality of patient care."  However,

The computer program also generated printed reports like this one evaluating each doctor's performance and productivity. On this document the doctors who hit corporate admissions goals received praise from company managers. Those who didn't knew it.

[Dr] Cliff Cloonan: The primary purpose of the scorecard was to track how you were doing in terms of revenue generation based on number of tests ordered and number of patients admitted to the hospital.
[Dr] Scott Rankin: It has nothing to do with patient safety and patient care. It has everything to do with generating revenues.

They say that when a doctor decided send to an emergency room patient home, the computer would often intervene, prompting the doctor to reconsider.

[Dr] Jeff Hamby: The minute I hit 'Home', it says, 'Qual Check.' And then it comes up with a warning, 'This patient meets criteria for admission. Do you want to override?'
[CBS Correspondent] Steve Kroft: What was the reaction from the administrators if you overrode the computer?

[Dr] Jeff Hamby: It was like being called to the principal's office.

Summary

Recent articles in the media have shown that physicians are increasingly practicing medicine as corporate employees (look here).  It is not clear how physicians in this situation can make sure they are always putting the interests of their individual patients ahead of other interests, including their corporate leaders' interests in increasing revenue and enriching themselves.  The most recent media reports discussed above add to the evidence that corporate physicians are constantly pressured to put short-term revenue generation ahead of patient welfare, and that they may specifically be pushed to admit patients unnecessarily, order unneeded laboratory tests, and discharge patients prematurely to satisfy corporate dictates.  One new wrinkle in this latest set of reports is how corporate executives may try to pretty up what they are doing by cloaking their actions within the quality assurance rubric, thus corrupting another important and well-intentioned component of health care.

The American Medical Association once declared "the practice of medicine should not be commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade." (Look here)  Despite such historic but now seemingly forgotten exhortations, and a complete lack of evidence of any benefits of the corporate practice of medicine to patients' or the public's health that might outweigh its obvious risks, the new movement to make every doctor a corporate employee marches on. 

A false hope of some resistance to it was just raised by that same American Medical Association in its new "AMA Principles for Physician Employment," but this only provided the ambiguous advice,

A physician’s paramount responsibility is to his or her patients. Additionally, given that an employed physician occupies a position of significant trust, he or she owes a duty of loyalty to his or her employer. This divided loyalty can create conflicts of interest, such as financial incentives to over- or under-treat patients, which employed physicians should strive to recognize and address.

How physicians could strive to recognize and address the inherent strong conflict of interest remains a mystery. 

Worse, while the principles recognized that physicians may be asked to sign "agreements or understandings (explicit or implicit) restricting, discouraging, or encouraging particular treatment or referral options," but rather than condemning such restraints on physicians' autonomy to give patients the best possible care, the principles only suggested that they "are disclosed to patients."

Furthermore, while the AMA response has been weak-kneed at best, I am not aware of any stronger responses from any other professional societies, or from state licensing boards, physician accrediting organizations, or any other organizations that are supposed to be concerned about patient's and the public's health, or about physicians' professionalism.

As I have said before, we need to challenge the notion that direct health care should ever be provided, or that medicine ought to be practiced by for-profit corporations. I submit that we will not be able to have good quality, accessible health care at an affordable price until we restore physicians as independent, ethical health care professionals, and until we restore small, independent, community responsible, non-profit hospitals as the locus for inpatient care.

Should Health Care be a "'Commodity, Subordinate to the Laws of the Market?" - a Powerful Rebuttal

In the US, it has become the accepted wisdom that health care is now an industry, not a calling or a profession, and the health care it produces is a commodity, not a human service. 

The Conventional Wisdom

For example, earlier in 2012 we quoted Dr Ralph de la Torre, the CEO of Steward Healthcare (formerly the Caritas Christi health system, a Catholic health care system whose take-over by Cerberus Capital Management, a private equity firm, was arranged in part by Dr de la Torre [see posts here]):

In deference to those who love the individual hospital, you have to look back at America and the trends in industries that have gone from being art to science, to being commodities. Health care is becoming a commodity. The car industry started off as an art, people hand-shaping the bodies, hand-building the engines. As it became a commodity and was all about making cars accessible to everybody, it became more about standardization. It's not different from the banking industry and other industries as they've matured. Health care is finally maturing as an industry, and part of that maturation process is consolidation. It's getting economies of scale and in many ways making it a commodity

More recently, Human Events, which describes itself as "the nation’s first conservative weekly," featured a description of a new book by one Edmund L Valentine, "CEO of the Stamford, Conn.-based MMC International, a health care consulting firm, which emphasizes its expertise in the pharmaceutical and device manufacturing fields.  In it, Mr Valentine stated that one should:

treat health insurance as a commodity, where companies only compete based on their reputation and price.

but presumably companies should not compete based on the effects of their products on the health of those who buy them.

Furthermore, he supported

the further industrialization of healthcare, ...


'Industrialization created our great economy,' he said. 'Allow the market and competition can fix the inefficiencies in the system.'

This ignored the arguments going back to the work of Kenneth Arrow that health care cannot be an ideal market (see this post), and all the data suggesting that in the last 20-30 years, when the market fundamentalists became so influential in US health care, costs have risen continuously and quickly without commensurate gains in access or quality.    These are just the latest of many examples of the business people who now run health care justifying approaching it as just another business.

A Strong Rebuttal of the Argument that Health Care is an Industry that Produces a Commodity  

For quite a while, Dr Arnold Relman has lead a relatively lonely quest to restore medicine as a profession and health care as a calling  (see posts here, here and here).  He noted that at one time, the notion that "the practice of medicine should not be commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade.'" was considered very mainstream.  (The quote came from the mid- twentieth century AMA code of ethics.)  We have done what little we can to support him.  However, the opposition to the new normal of health care as an industry that produces a commodity has paled compared to the conventional wisdom favored by rich executives and supported by billions of dollars of marketing, public relations, and lobbying budgets.    

However, this week strong support for health care as professions, as a calling, and hospitals as serving a mission just appeared in a big way in a major address to a health care meeting in Europe.  First, in the context  

during the current economic crisis "that is cutting resources for safeguarding health,"...   Hospitals and other facilities 'must rethink their particular role in order to avoid having health become a simple 'commodity,' subordinate to the laws of the market, and, therefore, a good reserved to a few, rather than a universal good to be guaranteed and defended,'  

  
Furthermore,

'Only when the wellbeing of the person, in its most fragile and defenseless condition and in search of meaning in the unfathomable mystery of pain, is very clearly at the center of medical and assisted care' can the hospital be seen as a place where healing isn't a job, but a mission,

  The speaker thus directly challenged the current notion that health care is a commodity, and those who work in health care have jobs, not callings or missions. 

While the speaker was in fact a retired distinguished professor from a European university, but before any market fundamentalists start thinking he could be pilloried as some radical European academic, note the following.

The conference was the XXVI International Conference of the Pontifical Council for Health Care Workers, and the speaker quoted above was Pope Benedict XVI. 

Thus there is some very distinguished, albeit not numerous support for the ideas that held sway before market fundamentalism took over much of health care, the ideas that medicine is a profession and a calling, and hospitals should be mission oriented organizations, and that health care professionals and institutions should put patients' health and welfare first, very far ahead of short-term revenue and the accumulation of wealth by health care organizational leaders. 

Health Care Academics' Unrest and Bad Health Care Leadership?

Last month we discussed a recent, large scale study of physician burnout, and wondered whether it would finally inspire some discourse about why physicians are really so upset.  In particular, we hypothesized,  based on some real, if limited data, that physician angst, dissatisfaction, burnout, etc may mainly be a response to the problems with leadership and governance of health care organization we post about on Health Care Renewal.

After that post, one of our scouts found a very interesting and relevant article from earlier this year which got little attention at the time, but deserves more.  [Pololi LH, Krupat E, Civian JT, Ash AS, Brennan RT. Why are a quarter of faculty considering leaving academic medicine? A study of their perceptions of institutional culture and intentions to leave at 26 representative U.S. medical schools. Acad Med. 2012; 87: 859-69. Link here.]

Study Design

This was a cross-sectional survey of faculty at 26 medical schools in the US, selected to be similar to the general population of medical schools in the country.  At each school, 150 faculty were randomly chosen stratified by sex and age, and then the sample was enriched to include additional minority faculty and women surgeons, for a total of 4578.

The faculty were sent a multi item survey to assess their perception of the organizational culture of their institutions, and asked about their intentions to continue in or leave their current positions and academic medicine.  Responses to each survey item were allowed to be from 1 = strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree.  The items on the survey were combined into various scales.  A number of items on the survey seemed to be related to issues we frequently discuss on Health Care Renewal.  These items ended up in three different scales, entitled Relatedness/Inclusion, Values Alignment, and Ethical/Moral Distress.  The survey items are listed below, grouped by issue, with the scales into which they were combined noted.

Issue: Mission-Hostile Leadership

Administration only interested in me for revenue   (Reverse coded) (Values Alignment)
Institution committed to serving the public (VA)
Institution's actions well-aligned with stated values and mission (VA)
Institution puts own needs ahead of educational/clinical missions (RC) (VA)
My values well-aligned with school's (VA)
Institution awards excellence in clinical care (VA)
Institution does not value teaching (RC) (VA)
Have to compromise values to work here (Ethical/Moral Distress)

Issue: Deceptive, Unethical Leadership

Felt pressure to behave unethically (Ethical/Moral Distress)
Need to be deceitful in order to succeed (EMD)
Others have taken credit for my work (EMD)

Issue: Generation of the Anechoic Effect by  Suppression of Free Speech, Academic Freedom, Dissent, Whistle-Blowing,

Feel ignored/ invisible (RC) (Relatedness/Inclusion)
Hide what I think and feel (RC) (R/I)
Reluctant to express opinion/ fear negative consequences (RC) (R/I)

So in summary, the survey contained quite a few questions about mission-hostile management, comprising nearly all of the Values Alignment scale, some questions about deceptive or unethical leadership, all in the Ethical/Moral Distress scale, and some about generation of the anechoic effect by suppression of free speech, academic freedom, dissent, and whistle-blowing, all in the Relatedness/Inclusion scale.

Results

The response rate was 52% (N=2381.)

Unfortunately, the article did not include the distributions of the responses to individual survey items, and only included the mean and standard error of the scale scores.  The values for the scales of most interest were:
Relatedness/Inclusion  3.56 SE= 0.022
Values Alignment  3.25 SE=0.028
Ethical/Moral Distress 2.36 SE=0.022

Note that the article did not address the degree individual items, especially those listed above, contributed to variation in the scale scores.


A small majority of faculty indicated their intentions to stay at their institutions (57%).  Of the remainder, 14% were considering leaving their school due to dissatisfaction, and another 21% were considering leaving academic medicine due to dissatisfaction.  The remainder were considering leaving due to personal/ family reasons or to retire.

The authors did complex multinomial logit modeling to assess the relationships among the various scales, demographic factors, and intention to leave.  Most relevant to us, Relatedness/Inclusion was significantly related to intention to leave the institution due to dissatisfaction (Coefficient -0.69, p lt 0.001, OR =0.50), as was Values Alignment (-0.39, p=0.04, OR=0.68), but not Ethical/ Moral Distress.  Furthermore, Relatedness/Inclusion was related to intention to leave academic medicine due to dissatisfaction (-0.48, p lt 0.001, 0.62), as was Ethical/Moral Distress (0.60, p lt 0.001, OR =1.82). The article did not address whether individual survey items, including those of most interest listed above, were related to intention to leave.  The article also did not address whether responses to the survey or intention to leave varied across faculty characteristics, medical school characteristics, or individual medical schools. 

Summary and Comments

This very large survey of faculty from multiple US medical schools showed that more than one-third were considering leaving their institutions or academic medicine due to dissatisfaction, indicating a striking prevalence of faculty distress.  Their responses to questions about perceived organizational cultural and leadership problems, including those possibly related to leadership's perceived hostility to the mission, leadership's perceived dishonesty or unethical behavior, and leadership's suppression of dissent, free speech, academic freedom, and whistle-blowing were related to their intentions to leave due to dissatisfaction.

These results suggest the hypothesis that much of faculty angst may be due to the sorts of problems with leadership and hence organizational culture that we discuss on Health Care Renewal.  Since this was a cross-sectional survey, it certainly does not offer scientific proof of this hypothesis.  Note that there is other evidence from numerous cases discussed in Health Care Renewal, qualitative studies and our much smaller study published only in abstract form that also supports this hypothesis (look here). 

One part of the author's discussion of their findings was particularly relevant:

Our findings are congruent with metaanalyses of 25 years of organizational justice research outside medicine. These studies suggest that employee perceptions of organizational justice and an ethical climate are related to increased job satisfaction, trust in leadership, enhanced performance, commitment to one’s employer, and reduced turnover.

 The scale of ethical/moral distress (see Table 1) reflects reactions to the prevailing norms and possible erosion of professionalism and increased organizational self-interest. There is a growing belief that organizations influence and are responsible for the ethical or unethical behaviors of their employees.To our knowledge, faculty perceptions of 'moral atmosphere' and 'just community' embedded in our survey have not been previously investigated in academic medicine, even though the ethical concepts of professionalism and justice can be used to guide the pursuit of excellence in the missions of medical schools. Several scholars have called for academic medicine to attend to its social justice and moral mission. Faculty perceptions
of organizational justice are pivotal to the critical issue of professionalism in medicine. The ethical/moral distress scale in the survey reported here included items such as 'the culture of my institution discourages altruism' and 'I find working here to be dehumanizing.' (See Table 1 for other items in this scale.) In that ethical/moral distress was more strongly related to intent to leave academic medicine entirely than intent to leave one’s own institution, these negative feelings among faculty must be particularly disheartening to them and may color major career decisions.

I believe that the study by Pololi et al adds to the evidence that physician distress is a symptom of a dysfunctional system in which major health care organizations have been taken over by leaders more devoted to self-interest and short-term revenue than the values prized by health care professionals and academics.  This applies obviously to academic medical institutions, but also to other organizations that might have been expected to defend such professional and academic values, such as professional associations, accrediting organizations, and health care foundations.  As we said before, if physicians really want to address what is making them burned out and dissatisfied, they will have to regain control of their own societies, organizations, and academic institutions, and ensure that these organizations put core values, not revenue generation and providing  cushy compensation to their executives, first.  

Paging Doctor EBDITA - How Private Equity May Push Hospitals to Put Revenue Ahead of Patient Care

Issues raised by the increasing influence of private equity firms in the direct care of patients were illuminated by a series of articles about the for-profit hospital chain HCA.

Quality Problems

The articles highlighted a series of concerns about quality problems affecting the chain's patients. 

Cardiac Overtreatment

First, a New York Times article described problems in the care of cardiac patients. 

HCA, the largest for-profit hospital chain in the United States with 163 facilities, had uncovered evidence as far back as 2002 and as recently as late 2010 showing that some cardiologists at several of its hospitals in Florida were unable to justify many of the procedures they were performing. Those hospitals included the Cedars Medical Center in Miami, which the company no longer owns, and the Regional Medical Center Bayonet Point. In some cases, the doctors made misleading statements in medical records that made it appear the procedures were necessary, according to internal reports.

More specifically, at one hospital, cardiac catheterizations seemed to occur to often: "about half the procedures ... were determined to have been done to patients without significant heart disease." Two patients at another hospital had severe adverse effects after cardiac procedures that seemed unnecessary in retrospect. There were "incidents at Bayonet Point where patients were treated for multiple lesions, or blockages, even when 'the second lesion (or third) did not appear to have significant disease....' [In] 'several cases'  ... patients were treated even though their arteries did not have significant blockages." Then,

HCA brought in an external company, CardioQual Associates of Franklin, Mich., in 2004 to examine medical records from Bayonet Point. In a confidential memo prepared in December 2004 and reviewed by The Times, CardioQual concluded that as many as 43 percent of 355 angioplasty cases, where doctors performed invasive procedures to open up a patient’s arteries, were outside reasonable and expected medical practice. Worse, the investigation revealed that some physicians had indicated in medical records that the patients had blockages of 80 to 90 percent when a later, more scientific analysis of a sampling of cases revealed the blockages had ranged from 33 to 53 percent.

Possible Undertreatment of Acute Illness

Then, a second NY Times article found that

HCA decided not to treat patients who came in with nonurgent conditions, like a cold or the flu or even a sprained wrist, unless those patients paid in advance. In a recent statement, HCA said that of the six million patients treated in its emergency rooms last year, 80,000, or about 1.3 percent, 'chose to seek alternative care options.'

Of course, the problem with this approach is that it is not always possible to tell how severe an acute illness is without a more complete evaluation than can be done in emergency department triage. There is anecdotal evidence that HCA turned away some patients who actually had serious illness:

Regulators in several states have taken HCA hospitals to task over screening out patients too aggressively, including situations where the screening missed serious conditions.

In early 2010, an uninsured patient who entered HCA’s TriStar Skyline Medical Center in Nashville, complaining of 'pain when breathing,' was sent away. An hour and a half later, at another hospital, the same patient was found to have pneumonia, according to the results of a Medicare investigation. Regulators cited Skyline for having 'failed to ensure that an appropriate medical screening examination was conducted.'

This year, the Office of Inspector General fined HCA’s Northside Hospital in St. Petersburg, Fla., $38,000 for sending home a feverish patient with an artificial heart valve. Two days later, the patient reappeared with the flu and severe respiratory problems. The following day, he died.

Undertreatment of Bed Sores

The second Times article also suggested that decreased nurse staffing at HCA hospitals lead to worse treatment of bed sores (decubitus ulcers):

Experts say there is often a direct correlation between bedsores and the quality of hospital staff levels. 'Staffing is critical,' said Courtney H. Lyder, the dean at the UCLA School of Nursing and an expert on wound care. 'When you see high levels of wounds, you usually see a high level of dysfunctional staff,' he said.

HCA owned eight of the 15 worst hospitals for bedsores among 545 profit-making hospitals nationwide, each with more than 1,000 patient discharges, tracked by the Sunlight Foundation using Medicare data from October 2008 to June 2010. HCA’s West Houston Medical Center and CJW Medical Center in Richmond, Va., landed near the top of the list.

HCA says it has increased its nursing staff at its hospitals each year over the last five years. But an examination of lawsuits shows bedsore problems have been persistent at several HCA facilities. In Portsmouth Regional Hospital in New Hampshire, a 60-year-old woman died in 2009 after her bedsores went untreated for three days and became infected, according to a wrongful-death lawsuit filed in the spring of 2011 in federal court against the hospital.

One HCA hospital

was cited twice by Florida regulators, in 2008 and 2010, for having inadequate numbers of nurses on its staff to oversee wound care for patients. During the 2010 examination, regulators noted that Memorial had less than the equivalent of two full-time nurses who specialized in wound care to treat the 132 patients who required aid.

'The system of treatment for wound care places patients at risk for additional medical complications,' the examiners said.

So, in summary, there is reason for concern about overtreatment of cardiac disease, and undertreatment of acute illness and bedsores at HCA hospitals. However, no hospital and no doctor is perfect. Everyone makes mistakes, and many decisions can be questioned in retrospect. Instead

Putting Money Ahead of Quality

Instead, the articles suggested they were part of a pattern in which concerns about short-term revenue trumped concerns about patient care.

Cardiac Procedures to Generate More Revenue

The article about cardiac care noted that one of the physicians who allegedly was doing too many cardiac procedures

was highlighted by the hospital in a 2009 business plan as being the most profitable doctor at the facility. 'Our leading EBDITA MD,' the plan described him. (Ebitda, or earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, is a measure of corporate earnings.)

On the other hand, according to the Tampa Bay Times, some of the doctors whom HCA suspended for doing too many percutaneous cardiac revascularization procedures charged that the issue was that

far from concern over the cost of stents — Bayonet Point was upset that stents were replacing more expensive bypass surgeries.

The first NY Times article also suggested that HCA executives did their best to keep the issue quiet so as not to affect revenue. First,

HCA declined to provide evidence that it had alerted Medicare, state Medicaid or private insurers of its findings, or reimbursed them for any of the procedures that the company later deemed unnecessary, as required by law.

Also,

HCA also declined to show that it had ever notified patients, who might have been entitled to compensation from the hospital for any harm.

The Times uncovered internal HCA communications suggesting that obfuscation was deliberate:

In January 2005, David Williams, who was then the chief executive of Bayonet Point, wrote in an e-mail: 'Clearly, we have protected ourselves under the peer review umbrella and have released very little information.' The recipients of his message included Dan Miller, who then oversaw HCA’s hospitals in western Florida, and Charles R. Evans, a Nashville executive who was president of all of HCA’s hospitals on the eastern side of the country.

In his response, Mr. Evans thanked Mr. Williams for the update and asked for a 'summary as to the business impact.'

Furthermore, as the last sentence above indicated, review of internal emails suggested that executives were more worried about revenue than quality of care or patient outcomes:

A review of those communications reveals that rather than asking whether patients had been harmed or whether regulators needed to be contacted, hospital officials asked for information on how the physicians’ activities affected the hospitals’ bottom line.

Avoiding Caring for Poor Patients in the Emergency Department

On the other hand, the impetus for triaging away apparently less acutely ill patients from the Emergency Department was to avoid such patients who could not pay. The second NY Times article noted there was a way for supposedly less ill patient to get Emergency Department treatment,

Patients whose ailments were not deemed urgent were told to go somewhere else, like a free clinic, or that they could be treated if they paid the co-payment for their insurance or around $150 in cash.

In addition, there is reason to think that HCA management pushed health care professionals to put off increasing numbers of patients, regardless of their clinical problems,

Several former emergency department doctors at Lawnwood Regional Medical Center in Fort Pierce, Fla., said they frequently had felt compelled to override the screening system in order to treat patients.

Also,

'Physicians had a really, really hard time with it,' said Dr. J. Patrick Pearsall, who worked for an emergency physician group based in Houston that worked in HCA hospitals. When the doctors failed to meet the hospital’s goals for how many patients should be considered emergencies, 'they really started putting pressure on.'

One emergency room doctor who worked at an HCA Florida hospital said doctors had been told they had targets to hit. The doctors’ concerns about the screening policy were acknowledged in an e-mail reviewed by The Times that was sent to the doctors at the hospital in early 2008 by an outside company that worked in the emergency room.

The doctors were told HCA’s regional executives were 'quite intent on pursuing this program at least for the time being and fully expects us to comply. Their expectations are that approximately 15 percent of all patients are to be screened and of those screened no more than 35 percent overridden.'

Keep in mind that variations in patient populations over time and across geographic areas means that the proportions of more and less severely ill patients showing up at individual Emergency Departments will vary substantially. Pressuring health care professionals to turn away a minimum percentage of people will make it very likely that at some times severely acutely ill patients will not be seen.

So it appears that at HCA, patients sometimes were overtreated, and sometimes were undertreated, and that executives trying to increase revenue may have been more responsible for both than simple human error.

Finally, there is reason to think that the take-over of HCA by private equity (that is, leveraged buy-out) firms further increased the for-profit corporation's emphasis on short-term revenue leading to worsening quality of care.

Private Equity Pushed for Even More Short-Term Revenue

The second NY Times article first noted,

During the Great Recession, when many hospitals across the country were nearly brought to their knees by growing numbers of uninsured patients, one hospital system not only survived — it thrived.

In fact, profits at the health care industry giant HCA, which controls 163 hospitals from New Hampshire to California, have soared, far outpacing those of most of its competitors.

The big winners have been three private equity firms — including Bain Capital, co-founded by Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential candidate — that bought HCA in late 2006.

HCA’s robust profit growth has raised the value of the firms’ holdings to nearly three and a half times their initial investment in the $33 billion deal.

The financial performance has been so impressive that HCA has become a model for the industry.

Note that the private equity firms extracted a considerable amount of cash from HCA at the time they turned it back into a publicly held for-profit corporation:

In 2010, buoyed by robust growth in profit, HCA was able to issue billions of dollars in debt that was used to pay funds overseen by the three buyout firms nearly $1 billion in dividends — each. In the spring of 2011, in one of the most closely watched public offerings since the financial crisis, HCA became a public company once again. Its three buyout owners each sold another $500 million worth of stock, allowing them to recoup all their initial investment.

By thus increasing the new public corporation's debt load, they further increased pressure on its executives to bolster short-term revenue.

However,

As HCA’s profits and influence grew, strains arose with doctors and nurses over whether the chain’s pursuit of profit may have, at times, come at the expense of patient care.

Summary:  Why No Hospital Should be For-Profit?

Among all developed countries, I believe only the US has such a high proportion of for-profit hospitals, and physicians employed by for-profit corporations to take care of patients.

However, in summary, this case shows there is evidence that
- The management of one for-profit hospital chain was pushed to focus even more on short-term revenue by a leveraged buy-out engineered by private equity firms
- This focus lead management to pressure health care professionals to increase revenue, even if that required over- or under-treating patients
- The resulting over- and under-treatment likely harmed patients.

As a Tampa Bay Times editorial put it,

the allegations suggest a disturbing pattern of endangering patients, and they again expose the weaknesses of a health care system driven by volume and profit rather than efficiencies and patient outcomes.

In a column in Forbes, Steve Denning warned,

The hospitals owned by private equity are making money in the short-term at the expense of Medicare and the economy. But when the private equity firms depart, as they plan to do, they leave the hospitals with a load of debt, dispirited doctors and nurses, and a bankrupt Medicare system, with serious questions as to whether overall care has been maintained, let alone improved.

The current bonanza for private equity from milking Medicare is a bubble that cannot be sustained.

We have noted how health care organizations have increasingly been "financialized," lead by executives who put short-term revenue generation ahead of all other goals, including good patient care. Furthermore, hospitals are increasingly likely to be formally for-profit, and hence likely to be lead by such executives. Worse, hospitals are increasingly likely to be owned by private equity firms, further increasing the emphasis on short-term money making. Even worse, physicians are now more frequently employed by such organizations, which may pressure them to do what it takes to increase revenue, no matter what the effect on patients' and the public's health.

The probably effects on the quality of care, access, and costs are obvious.

In my humble opinion, before the health care bubble bursts, we need to challenge the notion that direct health care should ever be provided, or that medicine ought to be practiced by for-profit corporations. Before market fundamentalism became so prominent, many stated prohibited the corporate practice of medicine, and the American Medical Association forbade the commercialization of medicine. It is time to heed that wisdom. I submit that we will not be able to have good quality, accessible health care at an affordable price until we restore physicians as independent, ethical health care professionals, and until we restore small, independent, community responsible, non-profit hospitals as the locus for inpatient care.

As Todd Hixon wrote, surprisingly in Forbes,

I believe a big part of the answer lies in changing the idea that health care should be a path to riches. There are professions, like university teaching and research, where a big part of the motivation is helping people and gaining respect in the community. If we could shift the balance for health care providers in that direction, solving problems like the one manifest at HCA would be a lot more possible.

True health care reform will require an end to market fundamentalism in health care.

Note - See also comments by Paul Levy in the Not Running a Hospital Blog.

Needed: A Webcast on Disruptive and Criminal Hospital Executives

I received this, unsolicited, via email:

Webcast:  Managing Disruptive Docs in a New Era of Hospital-Physician Relations

If you haven't already purchased this live Webcast, don't miss out! Left unchecked, disruptive physicians do more than just create a negative work environment; they endanger patient care and can lead to million-dollar lawsuits and bad publicity.  Our top experts will show you early intervention techniques and a range of effective resources that can help you reduce behavioral problems, retain star physicians, create a healthier workplace and save millions in potential lawsuits.

The agenda includes:

    Defining and identifying causes of disruptive behavior
    Economic consequences of disruptive behavior
    Overcoming disruptive physician problems

This program will be guided by your questions, so register now and ask away!

Your instructors:

Alan Rosenstein, MD, MBA
Medical Director of Physician Wellness Services

David Danielson, JD, CPA
Senior Vice President, Clinical Risk Management, Sanford Health

Scott Hurst
Former Director of Physician Alignment and Recruitment, CHRISTUS Spohn Health System

Managing Disruptive Docs in a New Era of Hospital-Physician Relations is designed to help CEOs, COOs, CMOs, group practice administrators, HR leaders, and physicians learn strategies and tactics to prevent, reduce, and limit the severity of disruptive physician incidents.

"Disruptive physician" is a vague term subject to enormous abuse, leading to sham peer review among other totalitarian tactics.   It reminds me of the old Soviet Union's politics.

You have been deemed a Disruptive Physician, Comrade.  You will be given a fair trial, then shot

In particular, this label can be used to suppress clinician concerns about care quality in an era of cost cutting and care manipulation through electronic workflow control systems (e.g., EHR's CPOE, CDS etc.)

The potential of being labelled as "disruptive" may be one reason why physician outcry against the very low quality of healthcare IT systems and dangers posed by them is relatively uncommon.

Patients - you - ultimately suffer when your physicians fear being your outspoken advocates.

As the many stories of healthcare executive malfeasance and profiteering at the expense of patients on this blog indicate, what is really needed for true healthcare reform are webcasts on:

MANAGING DISRUPTIVE AND CRIMINAL HOSPITAL EXECUTIVES IN AN ERA OF RAMPANT CORPORATIZATION OF MEDICINE.

-- SS

Addendum:  here are additional resources on the “Disruptive Physician”:

Abuse of the “Disruptive Physician” Clause, http://www.jpands.org/vol9no3/huntoon.pdf

The Insulting Physician “Code of Conduct”, http://www.jpands.org/vol13no1/huntoon.pdf

In the latter article, Lawrence Huntoon MD PhD, and expert on abuses of this label, notes:

... The typical physician code of conduct is initiated by a hospital administration. Its wording is curiously similar from one hospital to the next, suggesting that a template is being circulated.

... The physician code of conduct is intentionally insulting, demeaning, and degrading to physicians, and reduces physicians to being treated like juvenile delinquents at a reform school. It assumes that all physicians, like juvenile delinquents, need to be subjected to a long list of prohibited behaviors because, in the hospital administration’s view, physicians are predisposed to such things as theft, destruction of property, and physical and sexual assault. Conspicuous by its absence is any mention of “disruptive” or “abusive” hospital administrators, or any similar code of conduct applicable to a hospital administration.

Dr. Huntoon then goes on to make a recommendation, a "hospital administration’s code of conduct":

... The term “disruptive hospital administrator” and/or “abusive hospital administrator” should be incorporated into the hospital administration’s code of conduct and should be defined as anyone in the hospital administration who, in the view of the medical staff (as determined by majority vote), interferes with the ability of physicians to provide safe and high-quality care to patients in the hospital.

His detailed criteria for “disruptive hospital administrator” in the latter article are worth reading in their entirety.

-- SS

Private Equity vs Patient Care - a Bainful Example

A long investigative report in Salon summarized allegations about the quality of care in various treatment centers owned by Aspen Education, and its parent company, CRC Health Group, in turn wholly owned by a private equity firm, Bain Capital.  The article provides examples of what can go wrong when health care organizations are taken over by remote leadership focused overwhelmingly on short-term revenue.   

A Death from a Treatable Disease
The report opened with the investigation of a 14 year old resident at Youth Care, in Salt Lake City, and Aspen Education treatment center.  Brendan Blum "died of a twisted-bowel infaction," according to the local medical examiner, which allegedly went untreated because "two poorly paid monitors on duty," were slow to seek approval to call for emergency services, and "were too low on the totem pole to call 911 themselves."

The article cited "previously unreported allegations of abuse and neglect in at least 10 CRC residential drug and teen care facilities across the country."  It charged, "such incidents have largely escaped notice because the programs are, thanks to lax state regulations, largely unaccountable." 

Allegations of Toxic Corporate Culture

The article noted numerous other reports of unexplained and allegedly wrongful deaths, and other allegations of mistreatment of patients.

Furthermore, the article noted allegations "that such incidents reflect, in part, a broader corporate culture at Aspen's owner, CRC Health Group, a leading national chain of treatment centers.  Lawsuits and critics have claimed that CRC prizes profits, and the avoidance of outside scrutiny, over the health and safety of its clients." 

We have frequently discussed how the corporate culture of the finance industry, the industry that brought us the global financial collapse/ great recession, has influenced health care, and how this culture may be related to extensive problems with the leadership of health care, including lack of understanding of or even outright hostility to the health care mission, the prioritization of self-interest over the mission, conflicts of interest, and even outright criminal behavior, such as fraud, and kick-backs (bribery).  One way that finance may influence health care is the presence of finance leaders on the boards of trustees of non-profit health care institutions (see recent examples here and here). 

A more direct way the culture of finance can influence health care is for private equity firms (that is, re-branded leveraged buyout firms, look here) to purchase organizations that actually take care of patients.  The Salon article noted:

CRC’s corporate culture, in turn, reflects the attitudes and financial imperatives of Bain Capital, the private equity firm founded by Mitt Romney. (The Romney campaign also did not reply to written questions.) Bain is known for its relentless obsession with maximizing shareholder value and revenues. Indeed, this has become a talking point of late on the Romney campaign trail; he bragged to Fox in late May that '80 percent of them [Bain investments] grew their revenues.' CRC, a fast-growing company then in the lucrative field of drug treatment, was perhaps a natural fit when Bain acquired it for $720 million in 2006. In conversations with staff and patients who spent time at CRC facilities since the takeover, there are suggestions that the Bain approach has had its effects. 'If you look at their daily profit numbers compared to what they charge,' Dana Blum [the mother of the boy who died in the incident discussed above] said of CRC’s Aspen division in 2009, 'it’s obscene.' That point, ironically enough, was underscored by the glowing reports in the trade press about its profitability.

The article discussed how Bain Capital's acquisition of CRC Health Group further tilted the balance towards short-term revenue and away from quality care:

When Bain purchased CRC, it looked like an investment masterstroke. The company, founded in the mid-’90s with a single California treatment facility, the Camp Recovery Center, had quickly grown into the largest chain of for-profit drug and alcohol treatment services in the country, with $230 million in annual revenue. Under Bain’s guidance, its revenue has nearly doubled, to more than $450 million. CRC now serves 30,000 clients daily — mostly opiate addicts — at 140 facilities across 25 states. In the first five years after its acquisition, Bain had already extracted nearly $20 million in management-related fees from the chain, although Bain investors haven’t cashed in yet through dividends or an IPO. Bain’s purchase, a leveraged buyout, also saddled CRC with massive debt of well over $600 million.

According to company executives and independent analysts, hands-on oversight of subsidiary companies is a hallmark of both Bain and CRC. Romney’s campaign literature boasts about Bain taking exactly this sort of direct role in helping to turn around failing companies. 'Over the life of an investment, they have a strong management team willing to participate,' Sheryl Skolnick, an analyst with CRT Capital, a leading institutional brokerage firm, says of Bain.

The CRC acquisition immediately made Bain owner of the largest collection of addiction treatment facilities in the nation. Unlike some Bain Capital acquisitions, which led to massive layoffs, the company’s approach with CRC was to boost revenues by gobbling up other treatment centers, raising fees, and expanding its client base through slick, aggressive marketing, while keeping staffing and other costs relatively low. But that rapid pace of acquisition couldn’t be sustained in the mostly small-scale drug treatment industry alone. So Bain Capital and CRC set their sights on an entirely new treatment arena: the multibillion-dollar 'troubled teen' industry, a burgeoning field of mostly locally owned residential schools and wilderness programs then serving, nationwide, about 100,000 kids facing addiction or emotional or behavioral problems.

One of CRC’s first acquisitions under Bain ownership was the Aspen Education Group. Founded in 1998 with about six schools, Aspen Education had expanded to 30 troubled-teen and weight-loss programs by 2006, including Youth Care of Utah. With Bain’s backing, CRC purchased Aspen for nearly $300 million in the fall of 2006.

Less than a year later, Brendan Blum was dead.

At the time of the CRC acquisition, Aspen already had a history of abuse allegations, including at least three lawsuits, and two known patient deaths, one by suicide. Featured on 'Dr. Phil,' it grew out of schools inspired by the 'tough-love' behavior-modification approach of the discredited Synanon program, which was eventually exposed as a cult. By 2006, Aspen was facing a wrongful death lawsuit, later settled, over an incident in 2004 in which a 14-year-old boy, Matthew Meyer, perished from heat stroke just eight days into his stay at its Lone Star Expeditions wilderness camp in Texas.

This just underscores concerns we raised here about how ownership by private equity could undermine the ability of health care organizations to fulfill their missions. At the time we worried that private equity's short time horizon would clash with health care's long-term focus, how standardized cost-cutting approaches, including emphasis on individual employees' "productivity," could undermine patient care, and how private equity's obsession with secrecy is the antithesis of the transparency required to make health care accountable.

The Increasing Influence of Private Equity

Ironically, the reason that the problems at CRC have gotten such public attention is that the former leader of the private equity firm that controls it is now running for the US presidency. His candidacy emphasizes just how influential the culture of private equity has come.

The purchase of CRC came seven years after [former Massachusets Governor and now Republican presidential hopeful Mitt] Romney publicly announced his retirement as CEO of Bain Capital, where he had been in charge since its founding in 1984. But at the time of his departure, Romney worked out an arrangement to continue to share in Bain’s profits as a limited partner in the firm. Today, he is still an investor in 48 Bain accounts. Though he has refused to disclose their underlying assets, some information about them can be gleaned. For example, he has reported at least $300,000 to $1.2 million, if not more, in fluctuating annual earnings from Bain Capital VIII, the convoluted $3.5 billion array of related funds that owns both name-brand companies such as Dunkin’ Donuts and the lesser-known CRC Health Group. Most of these funds were made more attractive to privileged investors by being registered in the Cayman Islands tax haven. And Romney’s connections to CRC run even deeper: Of the three Bain managing partners who sit on CRC’s board, two, John Connaughton and Steven Barnes (with his wife), gave a total of half a million dollars to Restore Our Future, the super PAC supporting Romney. They also each donated the $2,500 maximum directly to his campaign.

Furthermore, it provides a warning about much more influential it might become, particularly in regard to health care:

Romney has been outspoken about his belief that for-profit health care companies can flourish only without onerous regulations. 'I had the occasion of actually acquiring and trying to build health care businesses,' he said during a primary debate last year. 'I know something about it, and I believe markets work. And what’s wrong with our health care system in America is that government is playing too heavy a role.'

The allegations against one of those health care businesses suggest another viewpoint.

I have frequently repeated a contention that true health care reform would emphasize leadership of health care organizations that understand and uphold the values of health care, starting with prioritizing the needs of patients and the public's health over all other concerns. Instead, there is a danger that health care leaders will be ever more removed from patients and the public, and their health needs, while they become ever more concerned with making as much money as possible in the short-run, and after that, the Devil take the hindmost.

Steward Health Care vs Rhode Island Blue Cross Blue Shield: How Public Relations Twists the Narrative

Negotiations between a local RI hospital system and the largest RI health insurer have now become very public. An advertising campaign by the larger hospital system that is set to absorb our local one provides lessons on how important health care policy issues are publicly discussed.

Simplified Background

Landmark Medical Center is a small health care system in northern Rhode Island.  It has been in financial difficulty, and hence management negotiated a buyout  [see comment of 19 July, 2012 below] while in receivership a buyout was negotiated.  It is now in the process of being acquired by Steward Health Care, a regional hospital system based in Massachusetts (summarized here and here).  Meanwhile, Landmark has been in negotiations with Rhode Island Blue Cross Blue Shield, the largest RI health insurance company.  The negotiations have not been going well, so RI BCBS notified its policy-holders that it is possible Landmark will not be in its network in the future.  This difficult negotiation prompted Steward Health Care to make the discussion more public.

The Steward Health Care Advertisements

Steward Health Care has run a series of full-page advertisements in the Providence Journal.  One advertisement that has run at least three times, by my count, includes the following text:

WHAT KIND OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION SPENDS $120 MILLION ON ITS HEADQUARTERS
BUT DENIES SERVICES TO ITS POOREST COMMUNITIES?

Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island is designated as a "charitable organization." But they certainly don't spend like one. They invested a small fortune on their opulent corporate offices in Providence. They dish out million each year in executive salaries. And for all that exorbitant spending, they pay absolutely nothing in Rhode Island state taxes.

Then, in May of this year, they refused to give Landmark Medical Center in Woonsocket a long-term contract without Steward Health Care participating. Steward, trying to be helpful, proposed base rates that were 5% below the state median, quality metrics used by the federal government, and a commitment to payment reform. But suddenly, the coffers had run dry. Blue Cross refused to even discuss the proposal.

Instead, they issued their response: Terminate Landmark Medical Center.

Never mind the residents who would lose their only hospital, the employees who would lose their jobs, or the elderly who would have to travel for care. Blue Cross was only interested in protecting the one group they serve most effectively, themselves.

This pretty plainly was a David vs Goliath narrative, with poor, small Landmark Medical Center and Steward Health Care, whose only goals were to serve local residents, as David, and huge, wealthy Blue Cross Blue Shield of RI, whose only goal is allegedly to serve its executives' interest, as Goliath.

Given that we have frequently discussed how self-interested, over-compensated executives may fail to uphold, or may even undermine their health care organizations' missions, this seemed like a narrative primed for further discussion on Health Care Renewal. In addition, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island was beset by a scandal before we began Health Care Renewal (look here), involving allegations of excess compensation given to and conflicts of interest affecting its CEO.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of RI: Executive Compensation, Budget and Taxes

In fact, the most recent figures made public by RI BCBS on executive compensation showed that CEO Peter Andruszkiewicz was offered total compensation of $600,000 a year when he started in 2011 (look here.)  Also, as suggested by the advertisement above, there has been considerable local controversy about the size, scale, and price of the new RI BCBS headquarters (e.g., here).   Apparently, however, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island does pay state taxes (per this report).

On the other hand, keep in mind that RI BCBS is one of the few health insurance companies to provide community (age-adjusted only) rated individual health insurance even for people with pre-existing conditions, (look here) at the behest of state law, to be sure. So perhaps RI BCBS is not quite the ogre oppressing the poor that the advertisement implies it to be.

But wait, there is more. This all started as a contract negotiation between a health insurer and a local hospital system which is about to be acquired by a regional hospital system. If Steward Health Care saw fit to bring up the executive compensation practices, budget, and taxes of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island as relevant to the dispute, might Steward Health Care's executive compensation practices, budget, and taxes also be relevant?

Steward Health Care and Cerberus Capital Management: Executive Compensation, Budget, and Taxes

The problem is that we know very little about Steward Health Care's executive compensation practices, budget, and taxes. While the advertisement above (and Steward's own web address, steward.org) imply that Steward is only about providing health care to the poor and needy, and perhaps that Steward, like Rhode Island BCBS, is non-profit, neither is quite true.

In fact, Steward Health Care is the new name for what was once Caritas Christi Health Care, formerly a Catholic non-profit health system that was acquired in 2010 by Cerberus Capital Management, a private equity firm (look here).

Private equity firms are notably secretive. Neither Cerberus, nor its new health care acquisition, has seen fit to publish any details about executive compensation practices, budgets, or taxes.

We do have a few clues, however.

Executive Compensation
Caritas Christi at the time it was acquired by Cerberus was lead by CEO Ralph de la Torre.  His compensation in 2009 prior to the acquisition was $2.2 million a year.  He is still leading Steward Health Care. It is reasonable to expect that his compensation is not less than it was before, and probably more (look here).  It is reasonable to guess that Dr de la Torre's total compensation is currently several times larger than that of the BCBS of RI CEO. 

The leadership of Cerberus Capital Management includes, according to its web-site, John W Snow, chairman and senior managing director.  Mr Snow, former Secretary of the US Treasury, was listed in 2009 on the Virginia 100 web-site as having a net worth of approximately $90 million, although not with much confidence in the precision of the figure.  He is also a director of the Marathon Petroleum Corporation, from which he received $300,000 in compensation in 2011, according to the company's proxy statement, and of Amerigroup, from which he received at least $170,000 in equities, and additional amounts in fees and deferred compensation in 2011, per that company's proxy statement.  Stephen A Feinberg, founder, CEO, and senior managing director, described as a "recluse" in the New York Times, was listed as number 21 on a list of the 25 most powerful businessmen in 2007 by Fortune, at that time running through Cerberus 50 companies with total revenues of $120 billion.  On Wikipedia, his net worth was estimated as $2 billion in 2008.  These figures suggest that leaders of Cerberus Capital Management can make very large amounts of money, orders of magnitude larger than the compensation of the BCBS of RI CEO.

Budget
There is little public information on the budget of Cerberus Capital Management, but note again the estimate above that in 2007, it controlled 50 companies with $120 billion in revenues.  There is also little public information about the budget of its subsidiary, Steward Health Care.  Estimates from a recent article in Commonwealth suggested that Cerberus invested $251.5 million in Steward, but that Steward's 2011 budget had a net loss of $57 million.  According to the Woonsocket Call, an apparently short-term balance sheet from March 31, 2012 showed that Steward Health Care had assets of $1.1279 billion, liabilities of $1.0259 billion, and stockholder equity of $102 million.

Taxes
There seems to be no significant public information on taxes paid by Steward Health Care or Cerberus Capital Management.  According to Chareles Ferguson in Predator Nation, Cerberus chairman John W Snow resigned as Treasury Secretary "in 2006 only because it was revealed that he had not paid any taxes on $24 million in income from CSX, which had forgiven Snow's repayment of a gigantic loan that the company had made to him."

So while RI BCBS can be faulted for paying relatively high executive compensation, using its funds to build a rather lavish headquarters building, but not for failing to pay RI taxes, at least all these have been issues for public discussion. Furthermore, Cerberus Capital Management, and Steward Health Care which is its creature, while explicitly bringing these issues into the public debate about the Landmark negotiation with Blue Cross Blue Shield of RI, have not seen fit to reveal their own executive compensation, budget, or taxes. There is reason to think that their executive compensation and management budgets could be far more bloated that those of RI BCBS. We have no idea whether they have paid what might be considered their fair share of taxes, but note that their current chairman has had issues in the past with his personal tax payments.

Summary

The vigorous advertising/ public relations campaign by Landmark Medical Center, Steward Health Care, and ultimately Cerberus Capital Management to get a more successful outcome of the negotiation between Landmark and RI BCBS seems to be an example of the tactics used in support of the public relations by large, for-profit health care organizations. In the absence of any transparency about the executive compensation, budget, and tax payments by Cerberus Capital Management and its subsidiary, Steward Health Care, lavish public advertising faulting the executive compensation, budget, and tax payments of its counter-party suggests a rather crude attempt to twist the narrative so as to divert public attention from relevant issues.

If this was not the intention, perhaps Cerberus and Steward will make their executive compensation, budgets, and tax returns fully transparent?  We wait with bated breath.

In the absence of such transparency, skepticism about their public discourse remains warranted.

There is more and more public discussion of health policy from the local to the global levels. Much of this discussion, like much political discussion in general, seems dominated by expensive public relations efforts on behalf of the richer health care organizations. Physicians, other health care professionals, health policy researchers and leaders, and the public at large should be alert to the possibility that these communications will use psychological manipulation to divert its narratives in directions favored by these large health care organizations. Anyone listening or viewing communications coming out of such public relations efforts ought to consciously think about the relevant facts and issues they ignore, and why they may have been consciously omitted.

Quantitating the Corruption of Finance Leadership (Who May Overlap with Health Care Leadership)

The bad leadership in health care that we frequently discuss now appears to exist in a context of an increasingly corrupt society.  In particular, we have discussed how the leadership of major health care organizations, such as teaching hospitals, and the universities within which medical schools operate, now frequently interlocks with the leadership of finance.  The ongoing global financial problems have been blamed on bad leadership in finance.

A Survey of Finance Leaders

Now, a survey by a law firm that supports corporate whistleblowers offers some quantitation of the corruption within finance.  The press release for the survey is here, and a summary of results is here.  The survey respondents were 250 US based, and 250 UK based "senior individuals within the financial services industry."

Key results were:

- 24% of those surveyed believed that the rules may have to be broken in order to be successful.

- 25% of UK respondents believed financial services professionals may need to engage in unethical or illegal activity to get ahead; US respondents were only slightly less inclined to engage in wrongdoing at 22%.

- 12% of total respondents believed that it was likely that staff in their company have engaged in unethical or illegal activity in order to be successful.

Perhaps exhibiting ego bias, the senior professionals thought that there competitors were even worse:

39% of total respondents believed it was likely that their competitors have engaged in illegal or unethical activity in order to be successful.

A substantial number of respondents admitted that they would be willing to engage in illegal activity were the circumstances favorable:

16% of total respondents were at least fairly likely to engage in insider trading if they could get away with it. Perhaps more troubling, only 55% of all respondents could say definitively that they would not engage in insider trading if they could make $10 million with no risk of getting arrested.

An important fraction thought that the worked within organizations that encouraged unethical and illegal behavior:

- 30% of all financial services professionals reported feeling pressure to compromise ethical standards or violate the law as a result of their compensation or bonus plan.

- In assessing other pressures that may lead to unethical or illegal conduct, 23% of all respondents also reported feeling other pressures to compromise ethical standards or violate the law.

Note that due to social desirability bias, the survey likely understates these problems.

Comment

Also note that at least so far, this survey is not much less anechoic than much of the evidence of corruption in health care that we have discussed. Although it has been briefly noted in the financial blogs and press, like Reuters, BusinessWeek, and also in the New York Daily News and Los Angeles Times, no other main-stream media has commented yet.

One post on a Forbes blog by Peter Cohan made the weary observation:

Business corruption follows a well-worn path. The boss tells you to bend the rules, and knowing that ignoring that request will cost you your job, you do what you’re told. At the end of the year you get a big bonus and promotion.

Then a disgruntled customer or employee leaks the shady activity to the press or a regulator and your company pays a fine and gets a few weeks of bad headlines. Time passes and the cycle restarts.

He concluded in part:

The conditions that make business corruption pay off have not changed despite numerous scandals — recent ones include Enron, WorldCom, Madoff, and Lehman Brothers – all of which reflect the same conditions that prompted me to write Value Leadership a decade ago: Let executives write their own report cards, base bonuses on those numbers and you will get corruption every time.

The solution is as clear to me as it is impossible to implement. First, all corporate financial reporting must be conducted by highly paid government auditors –rather than by auditing firms that are paid by the companies they audit. Second, performance-linked bonuses must be set aside in escrow accounts for a decade until it’s clear whether the true benefits of business strategies exceed their costs.

As long as there is no limit to how much money companies can put into politicians’ pockets, this fix will never be implemented. That’s because money puts big business in control of politicians who — if they were responding to the interests of the majority of Americans — would eliminate the conditions that make the benefits of business corruption exceed its costs.

But business corruption pays for those who finance Washington campaigns so the soil in which it flourishes remains fertile.

The same is likely to be true of unethical practices by and corruption of health care leadership. After all, health care leaders now mainly come from business management backgrounds, and so have been trained in the same way as financial professionals, and exposed to the same culture that they have experienced. As we have noted, the leadership of health care and finance often overlap. For example, see ours posts on the finance influence on the board of Dartmouth College; the role of the former CEO of bankrupt Lehman Brothers on the board of New York-Presbyterian hospital; the role of finance leaders who derided the Occupy Wall Street as "imbeciles," among other things on the boards of miscellaneous health care organizations; the role of finance leaders on the board of Pfizer, etc, etc, etc.

True health care reform may require larger reform in the greater society.  In any case, we need to reform the culture of health care organizations so that leaders put patients' and the public's health first, and self-interest last.  Furthermore, health care organizations should not provide positive incentives merely for exceeding financial or volume benchmarks, and should provide strong negative incentives for unethical behavior.

Administrators at Pepper Spray U Found to Have Violated Medical Professor's Academic Freedom

There they, the management of University of California - Davis, go again.

The Wilkes and Hoffman Op-Ed Questioning A University Sponsored Aggressive Prostate Cancer Screening Program

According to the Los Angeles Times, and a post in Inside Higher Ed, the trouble began when Dr Michael Wilkes, a professor of medicine at University of California - Davis, and Jerome Hoffman, a professor of emergency medicine, wrote an op-ed in the San Francisco Chronicle in 2010 questioning the wisdom of a program run by UC-Davis promoting aggressive screening for prostate cancer with the PSA test.  They brought up problems with using PSA for screening that have been known for a while, including the poor ability of the test to detect cancer, the inability of the test or of prostate biopsy performed in response to the test to differentiate aggressive prostate cancer from cancer that will not progress, which is more common, the risks of such biopsies, and the poor effectiveness of available prostate cancer treatments, compared with the frequency with which they produce harms.  All these issues have again been brought to the fore by US Preventive Services Taskforce's latest recommendations not to screen for prostate cancer, based on similar concerns.

Not only did Wilkes and Hoffman question the basis for the university sponsored program's aggressiveness, they speculated that it might have to do with money.  The program was sponsored not only by UC-Davis but by the American Urological Association Foundation.  In fact, that foundation's current corporate sponsors include:  Astellas Pharma, Inc., Endo Pharmaceuticals, Ferring Pharmaceuticals, Intuitive Surgical, Inc., Pfizer, Inc., and Qualigen, Inc., although the op-ed did not specifically list its commercial support.

The University Slap(p?)s Back

Nonetheless, per the Inside Higher Ed post,

Michael Wilkes received an e-mail from an administrator at the University of California at Davis. Wilkes, a professor at the medical school, was told that he would no longer lead a program sequence that taught better patient care, and support for a Hungarian student exchange program he headed would be withdrawn.

Within weeks, Wilkes was told that he would be removed as director of global health for the UC Davis Health System. He also received letters from the university’s health system counsel suggesting that the university could potentially sue him for defamation over the op-ed.

Again, this occurred despite the facts that many distinguished people have questioned the wisdom of aggressive prostate cancer screening, and that this particular prostate cancer program was supported by an organization that in turn is supported by money from pharmaceutical devices and drug companies that may stand to gain from selling drugs and devices related to screening for prostate cancer, and the diagnosis and treatment of such cancer. Wilkes and Hoffman were raising valid clinical and policy concerns about the public actions of a government-supported university, in my humble opinion.

Thus the university lawyer's apparent threat of defamation suits thus appears to be a SLAPP, a threat of strategic litigation against public participation. In California, a 1993 law provides recourse for people who have been threatened with SLAPPs (look here).

The Faculty Committee Responds

Regardless, Prof Wilkes filed an internal complaint, and again, per Inside Higher Ed,

Now, a committee on academic freedom at the university that investigated allegations of intimidation and harassment against Wilkes has found them to be true. The faculty committee said in its report, a copy of which was obtained by Inside Higher Ed, that the actions of the university administrators cast doubt on its ability to be a 'truthful and accountable purveyor of knowledge and services.'

The group has asked the dean and other top officials at the university’s school of medicine to write letters of apology to the professor, admit to errors of judgment, stop proposed disciplinary actions against him and take steps to prevent future violations of academic freedom. This week, representatives of the university’s Academic Senate are expected to vote on similar resolutions against the administrators.

Now, according to the LA Times,

The next step is up to campus Executive Vice Chancellor Ralph Hexter, who in consultation with Chancellor Linda P.B. Katehi is expected to decide by fall whether to impose any discipline on the medical school executives, campus officials said.

Good luck with that.

The Context at UC-Davis

I would be surprised if any such punishment occurs. After all, UC-Davis has a record of not tolerating dissent, but tolerating administrators who suppress such dissent.  We have previously discussed:
- How the UC-Davis police infamously pepper sprayed peaceful student demonstrators, apparently at least partially in response to Chancellor Katehi's vague orders to clear the campus (see post here).
- A subsequent report blamed this incident on incompetent, or worse leadership by Katehi's administration, but so far it is not obvious that this has lead to any changes (see post here).
- How UC-Davis adminstrators tried to punish a medical student who got in a dispute with an overly officious student who apparently was "monitoring" his actions on an email list server, apparently on behalf of the administration, invoking "professionalism" as if that meant blind obedience to academic administrators (see post here).

Furthemore, Chancellor Katehi has a record of her own relationships to industry.  Here we noted that she sits on the board of a large publishing conglomerate that includes a medical education and communication company (a MECC) as a subsidy.  So I suspect she may not rush to punish subordinate executives because they suppressed criticism of the role of commercial money in medical academics.

Summary

So UC-Davis seems to be another academic medical institution run by people more interested in bringing in commercial support than the academic medical mission, including the support of free speech and academic freedom.  Its case is another example of how leadership that seems hostile to the mission in one instance is likely to be hostile to the mission in other instances.

Here I summarized what I believe to be the real threats against professionalism in the academic medical context.  As we have said again and again, true health care reform would encourage leadership who understand the mission and will put its support ahead of financial concerns and ahead of their own self-interest.

See also posts in the Health News Review blog, and the University Diaries blog.