BLOGSCAN: Key Opinion Leader Admits to being a Marketer

Without any notable shame, and as a guest blogger on KevinMd.  The post was about other physicians can become big-time KOLs by using social media, and refers to another post which indicates that pharmaceutical companies look for physicians who are big prescribers of their products and have a lot of influence to, guess what, help market their products.  Although the blogger refers to ethics more than once, how it is ethical to trade on the trust physicians get for their professional vows to put patients first to market products (that may not always be good for patients) remains beyond me.

ADDENDUM (27 August, 2012) - See also comments by Dr Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog.  

Giant GSK Settlement Provides Reminder of the Pervasiveness of Stealth Marketing

The latest  and biggest legal settlement involving health care to hit the news, that of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and the US government, has many familiar elements. As summarized by the New York Times,

In the largest settlement involving a pharmaceutical company, the British drugmaker GlaxoSmithKline agreed to plead guilty to criminal charges and pay $3 billion in fines for promoting its best-selling antidepressants for unapproved uses and failing to report safety data about a top diabetes drug, federal prosecutors announced Monday. The agreement also includes civil penalties for improper marketing of a half-dozen other drugs.

As was the case for nearly every other legal settlement we have discussed,

No individuals have been charged in any of these cases.

Thus, how well even such a large settlement will deter future wrong-doing is not clear.

Nonetheless, the documents released with it provide good documentation about how pervasive systematic, deceptive stealth marketing campaigns have become in health care. 

In particular, the official "complaint" filed by the US Department of Justice emphasized all these elements in the stealth marketing of paroxetine (Paxil, Seroxat in the UK) to adolescents.

Manipulation of Clinical Research

We have frequently discussed how health care corporations, particularly pharmaceutical, biotechnology and device companies, now sponsor  the majority of clinical research.  Their control of the design, implementation, analysis and dissemination of clinical research allows manipulation that increases the likelihood that the results will be favorable to their vested interests, usually the products and services they sell. 

We have previously discussed the manipulation of Study 329 to promote the marketing of Paxil (look here and here).  However, the US DOJ document makes these concerns more official.  It included:

Manipulation of Study Endpoints

Study 329 was a randomized controlled trial of Paxil vs imipramine vs placebo for depression in adolescents. The two primary endpoints pre-specified to the US Food and Drug Administration were "the degree to which a patient's Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression ('HAM-D') total score changed from baseline"; and "the patient's 'response' to medication, as defined as (a) a 50% or greater reduction in the patient's HAMD-D score, or (b) a HAM-D score of less than or equal to 8." However, initial analysis by GSK failed to show that Paxil improved either of these two end-points. The company concluded "it would be commercially unacceptable to include a statement that efficacy had not been demonstrated, as this would undermine the profile of [Paxil]."

So the analysis emphasized secondary outcomes, the "Study 329 investigators later added several additional efficacy measures not specified in the protocol. Paxil separate statistically from placebo on certain of these measures." Adding numerous post-hoc measures increased the likelihood of finding a difference on at least one due to chance alone.

Manipulation of Data

Initial analysis of the data suggested that patients given Paxil experienced 11 serious adverse events, including five that appeared related to suicidal ideation or action. When the FDA later reexamined the data, "upon closer examination the number of possible suicide-related events among the Study 329 Paxil patients increased beyond the five patients GSK described in the JACAAP article as having 'emotional lability.' While collecting saftey information for the FDA, GSK admitted that there were four more possible suicide-related events among Paxil patients in Study 329. In addition the FDA later identified yet another possible suicide-related event in the Study 329 Paxil patients, which was also not among the 11 serious advents listed in the JAACAP article. Thus, altogether, 10 of the 93 Paxil patients in Study 329 experienced a possible suicidal event, compared to one in 87 patients on placebo. This is a fundamentally different picture of Paxil's pediatric safety profile than the one painted by the JAACAP article...." 

Manipulation of Dissemination

The report describing the results of Study 329 (Keller MB, Ryan ND, Strober M et al.  Efficacy of paroxetine in the treatment of adolescent major depression: a randomized controlled trial.  J Am Acad Child Adolescent Psychiatry 2001; 40: 762-772.  Link here. ) was written under the control of GSK. "In April 1998, GSK hired Scientific Therapeutics Information, Inc (STI) to prepare a journal article about Study 329. GSK worked closely with STI on the article by providing a draft clinical report to 'serve as a template for the proposed publication.'"

The published report of Study 329 "mischaracterized the results." "Although the ... article identified the study's two primary endpoints in the abstract, the article did not explicitly state that Paxil failed to show superiority to placebo on either of the primary efficacy measures." Also, "the article did not explicitly identify the two protocol-specified primary outcome measures - or that Paxil failed to show superiority to placebo on these two measures. Instead the article claimed that there were eight efficacy measures and that Paxil was statistically superior to placebo on four of them." In addition, "while the article listed the five protocol-defined secondary endpoints, the text of the article omitted any discussion regarding three of the secondary measures on which Paxil failed to statistically demonstrate its superiority to placebo and instead focused on the five secondary measures that GSK added belatedly and never incorporated into the Study 329 protocol. The article claimed that these finve secondary measures had been identified 'a priori,' therefore incorrectly suggesting that all secondary endpoints had been part of the original study protocol." In other words, the final published articles contained multiple outright falsehoods about the drug's efficacy that exaggerated that efficacy.

Furthermore, initial analysis showed that patients given Paxil had more serious adverse events than others. An initial draft of the study article stated, "serious adverse events occurred in 11 patients in the paroxetine group, 5 in the imipramine group, and 2 in the placebo group." These included "headache during down-titration(1 patient), and various psychiatric events (10 patients): worsening depression (2); emotional lability (e.g., suicidal ideation/ gestures, overdoses), (5); conduct problems or hostility (e.g., aggressiveness, behavioral disturbance in school) (2); and mania (1)." As noted above, the number of suicide related events was actually double that noted in this draft as "emotional lability."  However, the published version of the report "falsely state[d] that only one of the 11 serious adverse events in Paxil patients was considered related to treatment...."  Nor did it mention the true number of events related to suicidal ideation or action.

The article only "listed at most five possibly suicidal events among Paxil patients, brushed those off as unrelated to Paxil, and conclude that treating children with Paxil was safe."

Later, GSK marketing materials described the results of the study thus,

This 'cutting-edge,' landmark study is the first to compare efficacy of an SSRI and a TCA with placebo in the treatment of major depression in adolescents. Paxil demonstrates REMARKABLE Efficacy and Safety in the treatment of adolescent depression."

Thus the conrol exerted by GSK over the published article, despite its apparent academic authorship, enabled it to promote a drug that was not efficacious and had major adverse events as remarkably safe and effective, a totally deceptive result that would mislead any health care professional who used the article to guide clinical practice. 

Suppression of Clinical Research

GSK sponsored two other studies of Paxil in pediatric populations, Studies 377 and 701. As stated in the Department of Justice's Criminal Complaint against GSK,

GSK Did Not Publicize the Results of Studies 377 and 701
43. GSK learned the results of Study 377 in 1998 and the results of Study 701 in 2001. Paxil failed to demonstrate efficacy on any of the endpoints of either study.
44. GSK did not hire a contractor to help write medical articles about the results of Studies 377 and 701, as it had with Study 329.
45. GSK did not inform its sales representatives about the results of Studies 377 and 701.

Thus, GSK managed to conceal the fact that the majority of the studies it sponsored about Paxil used for adolescent patients showed no evidence that the drug worked, again seriously distorting the evidence-base on which clinicians made decisions, and doubtless leading to the use of a dangerous, ineffective drug by numerous vulnerable patients.

Bribing Physicians to Prescribe

GSK's sales representative reflected in their call notes their use of money, gifts, entertainment and other kickbacks to induct doctors to prescribe GSK drugs....

One really creative way to pay physicians to be exposed to marketing:

For example, in or about 2000 or 2001, GSK used 'Reprint Mastery Training Programs' or 'RMTS' to further promote drugs by purporting to pay physicians to train sales representative to review reprints of studies. Although the training was purportedly for the representatives, in fact, the sales force was already familiar with the materials. GSK typically paid physicians $250 to $500 to review the reprints.

Thus GSK simply paid physicians to use its drug, a practice characterized as kickbacks in the official complaint.  An article in the Guardian noted that the US Attorney involved in the case put it even more bluntly,

The sales force bribed physicians to prescribe GSK products using every imaginable form of high-priced entertainment, from Hawaiian vacations [and] paying doctors millions of dollars to go on speaking tours, to tickets to Madonna concerts.

Use of Key Opinion Leaders as Disguised Marketers

GSK also created a group of national 'key opinion leaders' ('KOLs') who were paid generous consulting fees. GSK selected many of these physicians based on their prescribing habits and influence within the community and used the speaker fees paid to these physicians to induce and reward prescribing of GSK's products. GSK used these individual to communicate marketing messages focused on the drug's marketing campaigns at the time, including off-label uses. Some physicians on GSK's speaker's board have been paid more than a million dollars for speaking on behalf of the company and recommending its drugs.

Thus key opinion leaders were paid specifically to market drugs, and as a reward, a bribe for prescribing drugs.

Consulting Fees as Kickbacks

In general,

In order to induce physicians to prescribe and recommend its drugs, GSK paid kickbacks to health professionals in various forms, including speaking or consulting fees, travel, entertainment, gifts, grants, and sham advisory boards, training,....

In particular,

During 2000 and 2001 at least, GSK also utilized events termed 'advisory boards' or consultant meetings and forums to disseminate its promotional message. Although these boards were purportedly composed of 'thought leaders' for the purpose of obtaining advice from the physicians, in fact, the 'advisory boards' were little more than promotional events coupled with financial inducement to prescribing and influential physicians.

Also,

GSK typically paid the physician between $250 and $750 to attend each local 'advisory' meeting. The payments did not reflect the value of services. The physician was not required to do anything but show up. GSK had no legitimate business reason to hire thousands of 'advisors' to 'consult' with the company about a single drug.

Manipulation of Continuing Medical Education

GSK also used so-called CME and CME Express programs and other sham training for marketing purposes, and to promote off-labe uses for the GSK prescription drugs.

Furthermore,

These CME programs purported to be independent eduaction free of company influence, but in fact functioned as GSK promotional programs disguised as medical education. GSK maintained control and influence over the purportedly independent CME programs through speaker selection, and influence over content and audience, among other things. Although third party vendors were usually also involved, they served only as artificial 'firewalls' that did not insulate the program from GSK's influence.

Summary

The legal documentation of the GSK settlement demonstrated how one drug company used an integrated, systematic campaign incorporating deception and bribery to sell drugs. Its elements included manipulation and suppression of the clinical research it sponsored, paying key opinion leaders to be disguised drug marketers, outright payments to physicians to prescribe drugs, and manipulation, again using payments to physicians, of supposedly independent continuing medical education. 

Note that while I summarized the elements of the stealth marketing campaign to sell Paxil, particularly for use in pediatric patients, the US government complaint also documents similar activities used to sell other drugs.  Furthermore, other stealth marketing campaigns have come to light through legal action, and many other instances of manipulation and suppression of clinical research, use of KOLs as disguised marketers, kickbacks and bribes, and manipulation of CME have been documented.

This means that any claims that:
- commercially sponsored clinical research provides clear, unbiased data that should drive clinical decisions
- health care professionals and academics paid as consultants by commercial health care firms are not influenced by these payments, and can provide clear, unbiased opinions
- commercially sponsored medical education provides clear, unbiased teaching
unfortunately must be viewed with extreme skepticism. This is particularly unfortunate given that most clinical research is now supported by commercial sponsors, and the majority of influential academics in medicine get some form of payments from the health care industry (look here).

Of course, there are some physicians who consult for commercial firms who actually provide clinical or scientific advice or assistance, and some commercially sponsored activities are honest. But we must wonder what garden path all those advocates for increasing industry "collaboration" to promote "innovation," and who regard conflicts of interest as "inevitable" and "manageable" are taking us down (e.g., look here and here).

Although the current settlement will require a huge payment, as I have said many times before (as early as 2008, here), do not expect such settlements to deter future bad behavior like that listed above.  The cost of the settlement will actually be spread among all company shareholders, all company employees, and likely patients and taxpayers.  However, the settlement will entail no specific negative consequences to the people who authorized, directed, or implemented the bad behavior.  In particular, executives whose remuneration was swollen by proceeds from the sales of affected drugs, and the health care professionals who willingly accepted what the US Attorney called bribes will not pay any sort of penalty.  The bad behavior listed above was doubtless personally very profitable for some people.  Unless people who indulge in such behavior face the possibility of penalties worse than their expected gains, expect such bad behavior to continue.

In fact, as the New York Times reported,

critics argue that even large fines are not enough to deter drug companies from unlawful behavior. Only when prosecutors single out individual executives for punishment, they say, will practices begin to change.

'What we’re learning is that money doesn’t deter corporate malfeasance,' said Eliot Spitzer, who, as New York’s attorney general, sued GlaxoSmithKline in 2004 over similar accusations involving Paxil. 'The only thing that will work in my view is C.E.O.’s and officials being forced to resign and individual culpability being enforced.'

True health care reform would strive to eliminate important conflicts of interest affecting clinical research and medical education.  Specifically, it would prevent corporations that sell health care products or services from controlling clinical research meant to evaluate these products or services.  It would seek to eliminate serious conflicts of interest affecting health care professionals.  Finally, it would prevent vested interests from controlling medical education.  Not that I expect any such reform in the near future, it would be too threatening to those who have personally benefited from the current system.

Hat tip to Dr Howard Brody whose Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog scooped me on the details of the settlement relevant to study 329.

ADDENDUM (11 July, 2012) - see also this post on the 1BoringOldMan blog.

"More Marketing Than Science" - An Anonymous Confession About Deceptive Marketing Published in the British Medical Journal

The British Medical Journal just published an anonymous article by a pharmaceutical company insider that explained once again how pharmaceutical companies turn research studies, apparently scholarly articles, and medical education into stealth marketing efforts.  (See Anonymous.  Post-marketing observational studies: my experience in the drug industry.  Brit Med J 2012; 344: 28.  Link here.)

We have previously discussed examples of health care corporate insiders confessing their individual efforts to turn medical research and education into marketing.  For example, peruse this.  We have also discussed how documents made public through litigation have revealed marketing plans for specific drugs that used apparently academic, educational, or scholarly publications and venues to market without revealing this transformation.  For example, see the Neurontin marketing plan (see post here), and the Lexapro marketing plan (see post here).  We have also discussed numerous examples of manipulation of particular research studies by those with vested interests, and outright suppression of studies whose results did not favor such vested interests.

Yet I suspect majorities of health care academics and professionals, health care policy makers, and the public at large do not realize, or would not admit that the evidence base for making health care decisions, and the general academic and professional discourse has been so corrupted.  So it is worthwhile to review once again how an insider summarized this corruption.

Research Studies Designed Primarily as Marketing Vehicles

In general, the anonymous author suggested that at least some studies were done for marketing, not scientific purposes:

some of the studies I worked on were not designed to determine the overall risk:benefit balance of the drug in the general population. They were designed to support and disseminate a marketing message.

Whether it was to highlight a questionable advantage over a 'me-too' competitor drug or to increase disease awareness among the medical community (particularly in so called invented diseases) and in turn increase product penetration in the market, the truth is that these studies had more marketing than science behind them.

Furthermore, the studies were supervised not by physicians or scientists, but by marketers in the marketing department,

Although the medical department developed the publication plans, designed the study, performed the statistical analysis, and wrote the final paper (which when published was passed on to marketing and sales to be used as marketing material), the marketing team responsible for that product were directly involved in all stages. They also closely supervised the content of other educational 'scientific' materials produced in the medical department and intended for potential prescribers. Instructions from marketing to the medical staff involved were clear: to ensure that the benefits of the drug were emphasised and the disadvantages were minimised where possible.

Manipulation of Research Design, Implementation, or Analysis

The author described how the marketers manipulated research studies so they would produce the results desired from a marketing perspective, regardless of their underlying truth,

Since marketing claims needed to be backed-up scientifically, we occasionally resorted to 'playing' with the data that had originally failed to show the expected result. This was done by altering the statistical method until any statistical significance was found. Such a result might not have supported the marketing claim, but it was always worth giving it a go to see what results you could produce. And it was possible because the protocols of post-marketing studies were lax, and it was not a requirement to specify any statistical methodology in detail. On the other hand, the studies were hypothesis testing (such as cohort studies, case-control studies) rather than hypothesis generating (such as case reports or adverse events reports), so playing with the data felt uncomfortable.

Other practices to ensure the marketing message was clear in the final publication included omission of negative results, usually in secondary outcome measures that had not been specified in the protocol, or inflating the importance of secondary outcome measures if they were positive when the primary measure was not.

So to summarize, the marketers would control the statistical analyses, promoting multiple analyses to attempt to come up with the "right" result that would support the marketing message (although the more kinds of analyses one tries, the more likely one is likely to come up with false results by chance alone). Presumably the marketers did not care whether or not the results were really true, which is perhaps why even they felt "uncomfortable" in some circumstances.

They would also foster the suppression of negative results, and the dredging of data for extra outcome measures when analysis showed no advantage in terms of the real primary outcomes. Suppression of negative results could be viewed as plain lying. Deliberate analysis of multiple end-points again risks identifying random error as true results.

The Role of Key Opinion Leaders

The author described how key opinion leaders, that is, health care professionals thought to be especially influential on practice or policy, were hired to become marketers presumably without revealing this intention.

Every big international observational study had a large advisory board. This was critical since the success of a newly launched drug in the market would depend on how many key opinion leaders were part of the study. Not only would they add credibility to the results, but they would also be key in influencing decision makers and other prescribers. In regional studies with thousands of patients, the study’s advisory board was formed by at least one key opinion leader from each country in that region, ensuring that areas important in terms of possible sales were covered. The contributions of the key opinion leaders to the study were always positive, but in my experience more directed towards designing new studies to answer their specific clinical questions rather than critically appraising our results and conclusions. In general, the relationship was amicable. We took them to the best hotels and restaurants during our advisory board meetings, and they appeared as authors in our research. Later, they would act as the company’s 'ambassadors,' giving conferences, teaching doctors, or talking to the media about the benefits of the drug.

Note that even the anonymous author could not bring him or herself to call the key opinion leaders salespeople, or marketers, but used the ambiguous wterm "ambassadors." Nonetheless, the role of key opinion leaders described would clearly be that of marketers or salespeople. However, it is extremely doubtful that any of these KOLs felt they had to declare that they were paid salespeople when presenting at conferences, teaching doctors, or talking about the media.

I would suggest that their actions would therefore fit Transparency International's definition of ethical corruption, "abuse of entrusted power for private gain." The KOLs are entrusted to be professional, and in many cases, scholarly. Using a professional or scholarly guise to act as a salesperson appears to be abuse of that entrusted power, in my humble opinion. In nearly every case, KOLs are paid, often handsomely, by the companies whose products they are selling. Thus, key opinion leaders acting as described by the anonymous author appear to be ethically corrupt.

Summary

The evidence of unethical marketing practices by commercial health care firms is mounting. Although I am most familiar with evidence from the US, there is mounting evidence that these practices are global, often done by companies that are not US based, and meant to influence practice and policy world-wide.

As the evidence mounts, it becomes increasingly clear that many such marketing practices are corrupt, at least in an ethical sense. Whether they may break laws in particular countries is a question for someone else.

The latest BMJ article is a reminder how skeptical the shrinking group of health care professionals who do not have conflicts of interest, are not biased in favor of particular products, and who put patients' interests first must be about ALL published research, scholarly publications, and apparently educational activities. Advocates of true evidence-based medicine must be extremely careful to try to use the least biased and manipulated parts of the evidence-base.

The mounting evidence suggests that at a minimum, all research reports, scholarly articles, media reports, conferences, and educational programs should provide full, detailed disclosure of all conflicts of interest. Perhaps having to make a declaration like "I am paid 50,000 Euros a year by the marketing department of company X to help market drug Y" before a supposedly educational talk would make some health care professionals think twice about such relationships.

However, even such detailed disclosure may not be sufficient to hamper marketing practices that now appear overtly corrupt. In my humble opinion, it is time to consider a global ban on the funding or influencing of human research by companies and other organizations which stand to gain financially according to the results of the research, or whose products and services are subject of such research. It is also time to consider a global ban on the funding or influencing of health care education by such organizations.

However, so many people are making so much money from the current practices that I doubt such proposals would get much support, or even public notice beyond this humble blog.

The Texas TMAP Trial as Illustration of a Systematic Stealth Marketing Campaign

Before it was abruptly ended by a sudden settlement for $158 million, the trial in Texas of a suit alleging unethical marketing of the drug Respirdal (risperidone) by the Janssen subsidiary of Johnson and Johnson opened yet another window on organized stealth marketing campaigns in health care. (Note that we first discussed this case here in 2006, and that this trial and the case was ably covered in detail on the 1BoringOldMan blog.) 

Even so, given all the recent attempts to dismiss critics of the pharmaceutical industry as "pharmascolds," (e.g., here), and to otherwise uphold the current status quo in our dysfunctional health care system, I thought it would be useful to rediscuss this case to show how systematic stealth marketing threatens the ideals of rational, evidence-based health care.

Evidence-based medicine may simply be viewed as medicine based on evidence and logic tempered with humanity. A slightly longer definition is practice based on the best evidence from clinical research derived from systematic searches, critically reviewed, used to maximize individual patients' benefits and minimize their harms according to their values.

In contrast, brief summaries of sworn testimony during the trial, and of a key report by an expert witness suggested how a commercial health care organization, in this case, the Jennssen subsidiary of Johnson and Johnson, could organize a stealth marketing campaign to promote practice based on deception and falsehoods, entangled in illogic and emotional and psychological manipulation. This was all done to market a product which could not so easily be supported by evidence and logic.

Deception and Falsehoods: Suppression of Medical Research

A Bloomberg report of the last day of the trial showed how the Respirdal stealth marketing campaign used the now classic mechanism of suppression of medical research:

Johnson & Johnson officials hid three studies showing some patients using Risperdal developed diabetes while claiming the antipsychotic drug didn’t cause the disease, a witness testified.

As early as 1999, Johnson & Johnson’s Janssen unit had researchers’ findings that about half the patients taking Risperdal in a study comparing its risks to those of Eli Lilly & Co.’s Zyprexa antipsychotic drug developed diabetes after a year on the medication, Joseph Glenmullen, a psychiatrist and Harvard Medical School instructor, told a Texas jury yesterday.

That study concluded Risperdal caused 'medically serious weight gain' that led study subjects to develop diabetes, Glenmullen testified in the trial of the state of Texas’s lawsuit over Janssen’s marketing of the drug. At the same time, Janssen salespeople were telling doctors that researchers concluded the drug didn’t cause the disease, Glenmullen added.

In particular,

Glenmullen, testifying as an expert for the state, told jurors Janssen officials didn’t turn over Study 113, which found Risperdal posed a higher diabetes risk than Zyprexa, to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration when regulators began probing links between anti-psychotic medications and the disease in 2000.

The drugmaker also didn’t turn over the results of two other later studies that found Risperdal and Zyprexa posed comparable diabetes risks to the FDA.

Suppression of research is a severe threat to evidence-based medicine because it can severely bias the clinical evidence base on which it depends.
Deception and Falsehood: Ghostwriting

A summary of the 86 page report by Professor David Rothman commissioned by the Texas Attorney General published in the Houston Press provided this example of ghostwriting:

A member of J&J's Speakers Bureau, [University of Texas Professor of Psychiatry Dr Alexander] Miller collected at least $82,000 from Janssen and its contractors. He declined to comment for this story, saying he may be called as a witness in the lawsuit.

Miller was a 'guest author' for one of Janssen's ghostwritten articles. Upon receiving the manuscript, Miller wrote, 'Yes, I am happy to be included as a co-author. I made a few minor edits and comments in the manuscript.'

In addition, another article in the Houston Press summarizing the issues before the trial provided this overview of the ghostwriting process:

As described in the AG's expert witness report, a company called Excerpta Medica was hired to draft some of Janssen's Risperdal articles.

In 2003, according to Rothman, Excerpta Medica issued 'Risperidone Publication Program Status Reports,' indicating that 30 of the 145 articles to be published had authors listed as 'to be determined.'

Rothman also examined what he considered a signature ghostwritten piece meant to boost Risperdal's pediatric profile; the study is included in the 2010 parameters.

Rothman cited a barrage of e-mails between Excerpta Medica and J&J in crafting the article. At one point, an Excerpta Medica employee wrote, 'It would be very helpful to receive some guidance in relation to the flow, format and subject in this paper and whether you think this is too marketing oriented or not, in order to prepare a next draft. Besides that we would like [to] have some suggestions for external authors on this paper. Maybe [a] U.S. and a European KOL? Your input will be much appreciated.''

The article eventually appeared in a 2007 volume of the European Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. For a lead author, J&J scored a heavy hitter: Dr. Peter Jensen, former associate director of child and adolescent research at the National Institute of Mental Health, and the founding director of the Center for the Advancement of Children's Mental Health at Columbia University. Now with the Mayo Clinic, Jensen declined to comment for this story.

This indicates the scope of this particular ghostwriting initiative: 145 articles were planned.  Thus, ghostwritten articles could comprise a major proportion of the apparently scholarly literature relevant to Risperdal.  Ghostwriting is fundamentally deceptive because it allows marketing to appear in the guise of scholarly work.  Ghostwritten reviews can deceptively shift the focus from the questions that need to be addressed by the evidence-based process to benefit patients to those whose answers would benefit marketers.


Deception and Falsehoods: Key Opinion Leaders
Emotional and Psychological Manipulation: Creation of Conflicts of Interest

An important element of most stealth marketing campaigns is the creation of key opinion leaders.  These are academics or professionals who can promote products in the guise of unbiased expertise. 

A summary of the 86 page report by Professor David Rothman commissioned by the Texas Attorney General published in the Houston Press provided the example of Dr Steven Shon:

As the head of the state's mental health agency, Shon was perhaps Janssen's most crucial key opinion leader; his influence in pushing ­Risperdal was invaluable.

He accepted at least $47,000 from Janssen and its medical ghostwriter, Excerpta Medica, and signed an agreement to be a member of Johnson & Johnson's Speakers Bureau. Rothman writes, 'The medical director of the state's mental health agency should not be serving as an official spokesperson for a pharmaceutical company whose product state agencies are purchasing.'

The company paid for his trips across the country, and even overseas, to promote ­Risperdal as a safe and effective medication. (But the romance between Janssen and Shon was not without its bumps; Shon would get 'upset' if the checks he accepted from Janssen were made out to the MHMRA instead of directly to him. Apparently, those were more difficult to funnel into his personal account.)

Shon retired in 2005, allowing him to collect his taxpayer-funded pension. He moved to Las Vegas, where he's the director of psychiatry for a mental health and substance abuse clinic called Harmony Healthcare.

Shon was so influential that Janssen grew paranoid and possessive when it learned that other companies sought his partnership as well. When J&J employee Yolanda Roman heard that Eli Lilly had flown him to their headquarters on a private jet, she wrote, "Steve I suppose is enjoying the vast attention and response he can command from Industry...Obviously, Steve has the right to be served by all Industry, let's hope he remains fair [and] balanced and remembers who PLACED HIM ON THE 'TMAP' MAP."

Meanwhile, another employee busted out the caps-lock to warn that "WE WILL NOT LET LILLY OR PFIZER PREVAIL WITH OUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLIC SECTOR THOUGHT LEADER."

Similarly, a Bloomberg report of Dr Shon's trial testimony included:

Johnson & Johnson’s Janssen unit paid a Texas mental health official to speak around the U.S. about state guidelines on prescribing antipsychotic drugs that gave preference to medicines like the company’s Risperdal, the official said.

Steven Shon accepted honorariums to fly to Arizona, Florida and New Jersey to discuss Texas guidelines developed in 1999 advising doctors that a newer class of drugs like Risperdal were a “first choice or option” for schizophrenia, he testified today in state court in Austin.

Also,

Attorneys for Jones questioned Shon, who served as medical director of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation until he involuntarily retired in 2006.

Shon testified that he served on Janssen advisory boards, was a board member of a Janssen publication called 'Mental Health Issues Today' and was a continuing medical education speaker in programs sponsored by the company.

Shon was asked about six trips in which he got honorariums of $3,000 from Janssen to discuss the TMAP project. In several cases, he kept those payments, he said.

In testimony yesterday, a Texas Medicaid investigator said Shon signed several consulting agreements with Janssen, and the company paid him $47,587 over several years.

Dr Shon's value to Janssen derived from his position as the respected leader of the state's mental health agency. While he was apparently paid by Janssen marketers who saw him as an ally, his marketing was all the more effective because it seemed to come from an unbiased expert. As such it was deceptive.

The Institute of Medicine report on conflicts of interest defined them as "a set of circumstances that creates a risk that professional judgment or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest." The report, and indeed much of the discussion of conflicts of interest in health care assumes that most secondary interests are "-within limits - legitimate and even desirable goals." For example, an academic physician who also was a basic scientist could be paid by a pharmaceutical company to do a specific assay on samples used in research. In that case, the payments could conceivably create a risk that the academic's professional judgment in a clinical setting would be unduly favorable to the products of the company. However, the relationship hardly seems intended to cause such a bias. Notions that conflicts of interest are "inevitable" but "manageable" may stem from consideration of conflicts of interest like this.

However, conflicts of interest deliberately created as perverse incentives may be much more consequential, and as this example shows, perhaps not rare. It appears that Janssen paid Dr Shon not to do some task that was unrelated to how he fulfilled his primary entrusted responsibilities as director of mental health, but in order to influence how he fulfilled them. We have noted previous examples in which corporate marketers consider paid key opinion leaders as sales people (see posts here and here). Such conflicts are deliberately created so that the recipient of payments uses his or her entrusted responsibilities to serve the vested interests of the payer may be deceptive, as noted above.  Furthermore, by being intended to induce changes in how the payee performs his or her primary responsibilities, these conflicts are particularly likely to lead to abuse of these entrusted responsibilities. Given that the Transparency International definition of corruption is abuse of entrusted power for private gain, we need a new and more incisive term to described this variety of conflicts of interest.

The motivation of key opinion leaders by created conflicts of interest can result in powerful manipulation of the key opinion leaders, but more importantly of their audience. 

Emotional and Psychological Manipulation: Intimidation

Another Bloomberg report included testimony about how someone who attempted to blow the whistle about the Respirdal stealth marketing campaign was intimidated:

Allen Jones testified yesterday in state court in Austin, Texas, that he was an investigator in the Pennsylvania Office of Inspector General in 2002 when he looked into an unregistered bank account run by Steven Fiorello, the pharmacist. Fiorello was on a Pennsylvania committee weighing whether to require doctors to give priority to newer, more expensive drugs like Risperdal in state-funded treatment of mental-health patients, Jones said.

Jones, 57, said he found a $4,000 check from J&J’s Janssen unit to Harrisburg State Hospital that was sent “\'to the attention of' Fiorello. The check covered a Fiorello trip to New Orleans to discuss Pennsylvania’s drug guidelines. Another check for $1,766 to the hospital account was sent 'in care of' of Fiorello, Jones said. Fiorello controlled the account and didn’t register it with the state, Jones said.

'The account was used to deposit money from drug companies,' Jones said yesterday in the trial’s third day of testimony. 'There were real problems here. On many levels, the account was improper.'

Janssen also paid $2,000 directly to Fiorello as an honorarium for his speaking at a company-sponsored event in 2002, Jones said. Jones said he followed the money trail and explored efforts by Janssen to promote, on a state-by-state basis, Texas guidelines favoring drugs like Risperdal. The funds sent to the hospital account helped pay travel expenses for programs related to setting up the Texas guidelines in Pennsylvania, he said.

The state adopted the guidelines that favored Risperdal in 2003, Jones said.

Note that this testimony appears to be about yet another KOL paid to promote guidelines that would in turn promote the marketing of Respirdal. So this is yet another case of a conflict of interest apparently deliberately created to influence the individual's primary responsibility.

However, then

Jones said his boss told him to ease off his probe. He said he was told, 'Stay away from the drug companies. This is a personnel issue. Stay away from the drug companies, stay away from TMAP.


Jones said his boss said, 'Drug companies write checks to both sides of the aisle. Stay away from it.' His boss told him that 'morally and ethically I was correct, but politically, this was dead.'

Jones said that later he was removed as the lead investigator from the case, and he was 'marginalized completely.' He continued to pursue the case on his own time, and spoke to the New York Times for a story that ran Feb. 1, 2004. He said he was fired for talking to the newspaper.

So Jones was intimidated to the extent that he lost his job. Note further that the implication is that this intimidation stemmed from yet more conflicts of interest created by Janssen, payments to politicians. This underlines how stealth marketing campaigns become complex systems.

Note further that in retrospect, Jones' complaints were deemed true by a court of law and a state commission:

Fiorello, once the chief pharmacist for Pennsylvania’s public welfare department, was convicted in December 2008 of felony conflict-of-interest charges for taking payments from drug companies, including Janssen and Pfizer Inc. He was sentenced to 18 months of probation and fined $3,000. He also paid more than $27,000 in civil fines after the Pennsylvania Ethics Commission cited him.

In a sense, intimidation and created conflicts of interest are two sides of the same coin.  Both involve the deliberate imposition of incentives, either positive or negative.  These incentives are designed to further marketing aims and organizational interests, not to improve patient care or public health, or advance science.  Thus they are powerful tools of emotional and psychological manipulation.
Summary

Note that even the brief summaries of trial evidence suggested how systematic the campaign was, and how within it, the elements of deception and falsehoods (instead of evidence), and emotional and psychological manipulation (instead of logic and humanity) were predominant. This should be added to previous discussion of stealth marketing campaigns, including such examples as that of Neurontin here).

Stealth marketing campaigns are complex examples of how behavior meant to further vested interests may directly threaten evidence-based practice, physicians' professionalism, and ultimately patients' and the public's health.

There have been many calls (e.g., see recent posts here and here) for increased "collaboration" among health professionals and academics and industry.  Often they are justified by the need for "innovation," while resulting conflicts of interest are deemed "manageable."  The current examples show how the vested interests of health care organizations operating within a laissez faire, anything goes environment may make such collaboration poisonous.

Embedded Networks of Influence in Health Care: An Illustrative Case

At the 12th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), sponsored by Transparency International, one of the plenary sessions was devoted to the topic of "embedded networks of influence."  The session description included this description of the topic as:

the major stumbling block in the fight against corruption, namely, the power of 'embedded networks' in advancing personal or group interests through state institutions. The extent of their power can create what is known as “state capture” meaning democratic governance failure. It will take a close look at the influential role of private sector, especially of the multinational private sector.

A recent investigative report in the Chronicle of Higher Education illustrated a striking case of how one key individual has affected health care through multiple connections to what can be regarded as embedded networks of influence, thus tying in to many of the topics we have discussed on Health Care Renewal.

The article focused on the University of Miami and its current President, Donna Shalala. Let me summarize the set of relevant topics in roughly chronological order and note how the article links them to President Shalala.

Speech Codes and Restrictions on Free Speech within Academia

As I wrote in my 2003 article, (Poses RM. A cautionary tale: the dysfunction of the American health care system.  Eur J Int Med 2003; 14: 123-130.  Link here), speech codes and other restrictions on free speech within academia created the framework for the suppression of clinical research that may offend those with vested interests:

Failure of universities to champion the academic freedom of their clinical researchers may stem from their abandonment of their own academic core value of free enquiry. There is abundant evidence that universities may restrict expression and limit academic freedom. In The Shadow University, Kors and Silverglate charged that 'universities have become the enemy of a free society.' Universities have punished faculty and students who raised unpopular viewpoints.

In the Chronicle,

Ms. Shalala, ... was previously president of Hunter College of the City University of New York and chancellor of the University of Wisconsin at Madison....

The Shadow University, the pioneering work on challenges to individual rights by leaders at academic institutions, dealt with Ms Shalala's role as a leading early proponent of silencing speech that offended academic leaders.

Wisconsin chose to enact a speech code. On March 29, 1990, the Wisconsin ACLU joined a suit against the university, announcing that the important moral goals of toleration and equal opportunity 'can be accomplished through means other than the creation of rules which infringe upon the fundamental freedom to express ideas.'

The speech code was drafted with the help of UW-Madison Law School professors Richard Delgado, Gordon Baldwin, and Ted Finman.... On June 9, 1989, upon recommendation by Chancellor Shalala, it was adopted by the Board of Regents...."

The speech code was soon declared unconstitutional by a federal court, which held:

the policy was unconstitutional precisely because 'the UW rule regulates its speech upon its content.'

Ms Shalala then:

recommended a new code to the regents in the spring of 1992, which they adopted in March.

However,

Faced with another lawsuit, the regents reversed themselves

For these and similar efforts, as discussed by Evans and Novak in 1993, Ms Shalala was dubbed "the Queen of PC" [political correctness].

Speech codes and other restrictions on free speech in the academic setting seem mainly to be used to target speech that administrators find offensive, including speech critical of management practices. This is echoed in the Chronicle story, which suggested how fearful University of Miami faculty now are of criticizing Ms Shalala:

Others, including several current and former faculty members, outline their complaints in far more detail. But they do so anonymously, saying they don't want to tangle head-on with such a politically powerful president.

Ms Shalala's prominence in academics, probably more due to rather that in spite of her hostility to free speech and free enquiry, may have enabled her to join another and even more powerful network of influence, this one at the center of the US political world.
 
The Rise of Commercial Health Insurance 

In Deadly Spin, former CIGNA executive Wendell Potter documented how clever and unscrupulous use of public relations and marketing techniques enabled commercial health care insurance and managed care companies to increase dominance of US health care, while allowing health care costs to soar, and denying access to larger numbers of patients. 

The Chronicle article briefly alluded to Ms Shalala's role in the rise of for-profit health insurance.  Despite being labelled "farthest to the left and most controversial of all President-elect Clinton's Cabinet appointments," again per Evans and Novak, Ms Shalala departed the University of Wisconsin in 1993 to become US Secretary of Health and Human Services. In that role, she presided over the administration's failed attempt at health care reform, as Potter wrote,

When President Bill Clinton was forced to give up on comprehensive health care reform in 1994, the damage was far more extensive than anyone could have imagined - the administration's defeat emboldened health insurance companies to totally redefine the mission and methods of an industry that now strands nearly fifty million people without insurance.

As I outlined..., insurers knew after the Clinton disaster that the coast was clear for them to abandon nonprofit practices, long-standing commitments to public service, and traditional insurance models and turn instead to satisfying Wall Street investors' desire to make money, by limiting spending on health care.

Note that my only quibble with what Wendell Potter wrote is that it may be that the insurance companies' top executives, rather than their stockholders who benefited the most from these changes, as we will address below.

Ms Shalala remained Secretary of HHS until 2001, but after the failure of the health care reform proposal in 1994, her department apparently did nothing to try to ameliorate the changes to health care that Potter described above.

Bloated Executive Compensation Disproportionate to Any Measure of Organizational Performance

We have frequently discussed how health care leaders now seem entitled to get huge amounts of compensation disproportionate to their organizations' performance and their responsibility for it. 

Despite Ms Shalala's reputation in the 1990s as an extreme leftist, upon leaving her role in the Clinton administration, she almost immediately embraced the for-profit corporate model of health insurance. In a notable example of what now is called the "revolving door" that went unnoticed at the time,  Ms Shalala went from would be regulator of commercial managed care to leader of commercial managed care.  As noted by the Chronicle:

Debates over ethical boundaries are not new to those involved in the university's growth surge. Ms. Shalala was on the compensation committee of the board of the health insurer UnitedHealth Group when it was caught in one of the nation's largest-ever stock-options scandals. She also received low-cost loans in 2002 as part of a favors-for-politicians scandal at Countrywide Financial Corporation.

Both Ms. Shalala and [University of Miami medical school dean] Dr. Goldschmidt have served on the boards of companies directly or indirectly affected by the university's business decisions. The university had $30-million in annual business with UnitedHealth Group when Ms. Shalala was on its board.

Note that Ms Shalala served as Secretary of Health and Human Services from 1993 to 2001, (see this list), then joined the board of UnitedHealth Group within months (see this article.)

We discussed in considerable detail the ethical failings of UnitedHealth Group while Ms Shalala had fiduciary responsibility as a board member for its conduct. A particularly striking failing was how the board of directors granted sufficient back-dated stock options to the company's former CEO to make him a billionaire on paper.  The resulting scandal was followed by his resignation.  Later, Dr McGuire was forced to give back some the options.  The final settlement of the fiasco cost UnitedHealth $895 million, and Dr McGuire $30 million and the cancellation of 3.6 million stock options.  As we most recently summarized here, former CEO William McGuire was one of the top 10 best compensated CEOs of the first decade of the 21st century, despite the company's multiple ethical failings. 

Conflicts of Interest, Especially Involving Key Opinion Leaders who Promote Marketing Objectives Cloaked in Academic Respectability

We have extensively discussed the web of conflicts of interest that now pervades health care. For academic health care leaders, the most intense kind of conflict of interest may be created by service on the board of directors of a for-profit health care corporation.  Note that corporate directors, as we have discussed previously, have a fiduciary duty to exhibit "unyielding loyalty" to the stockholders of the company and their interests  [Per Monks RAG, Minow N. Corporate Governance, 3rd edition. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004. P.200.].  We first started to discuss the intense conflicts of interest generated when leaders of academic medicine are also members of boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations in 2006.  The issue really made the big time in 2010 when the New York Times published a front page article in its Sunday Business section about whether university presidents who also were corporate directors were part of an "academic-industrial complex."  As we noted above, Ms Shalala's service on the board of UnitedHealth Group created such a conflict, and she apparently presided a similar board level conflict of interest affecting her medical school dean. 

A particularly pernicious kind of conflict of interest may be created when a company selling health care goods or services pays an academic to become a "key opinion leader."  Industry spokespeople and key opinion leaders themselves tout KOLs as clinical, educational, and/or scientific experts chosen for their expertise to advance medicine, science and public health.  There are documented instances (e.g., see posts here and here) in which defectors from marketing departments of commercial health care corporations described KOLs as salespeople who could be more influential hidden within their professional or academic cloaks.  Even some physicians paid to be speakers on behalf of pharmaceutical corporations have acknowledged their role as salespeople in fancy dress (see post here).  There are cases of documents revealed by discovery in legal actions that show how companies planned organized stealth marketing efforts for drugs that included activities by KOLs (e.g., see post here about marketing of Lexapro, and here about Neurontin).

The Chronicle recounted how Ms Shalala also was linked to one of the better known examples of industry paid KOLs:

Dr. Goldschmidt did not fully report the income from such corporate associations on the medical school's financial-disclosure Web site, even while promoting the site as evidence of his faculty's commitment to openness. He also brought to Miami a repeat violator of financial-conflict-of-interest standards, Charles B. Nemeroff, to serve as a professor and chairman of the department of psychiatry and behavioral sciences.

In a companion article, the Chronicle summarized Dr Nemeroff's career thus:

Dr. Nemeroff had quit as chairman of Emory University's psychiatry department in December 2008 after the university received complaints about his secretly receiving money from GlaxoSmithKline and other pharmaceutical companies while helping promote their products.

We (Dr Bernard Carroll more than yours truly)  have posted previously about Dr Nemeroff's exploits, including those at the University of Miami, numerous times. 

The Fall of Municipal Hospitals, the Rise of For-Profit Hospitals

We have frequently discussed how the leaders have undermined health care organizations' core missions, and particularly how hospitals and hospital systems have strayed from their patient care mission to make more money. The Chronicle suggested how Ms Shalala's leadership of the University of Miami has enriched the institution's teaching hospital at the apparent expense of the local municipal hospital system:

Another set of problems, cited by current and former university faculty and Jackson staff members, stems from the 2007 takeover of a facility that became the University of Miami Hospital, across the street from Jackson. The purchase has greatly expanded the university's ability to direct many of the area's most profitable patients and procedures to the new facility and to other university-owned hospitals, further worsening Jackson's own considerable budget woes.

In addition,

The university's patient-enrollment practices were part of the problem. The inspector general of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida are looking into the question of whether university doctors routinely enrolled Jackson patients in research projects without telling the hospital.

In a 2008 letter from Jackson officials to university leaders, Nathan Anspach, who was vice president for physician services at the hospital, described a series of failed efforts 'to stop new clandestine research' at Jackson by university doctors.

Meetings with university officials aimed at stopping the practice 'went badly,' Mr. Anspach wrote, and Dr. Goldschmidt, the medical-school dean, was 'outwardly annoyed' by Jackson's requests for information that would help it identify research patients in the building.

Ms. Shalala was copied on at least some of the correspondence, including a 2006 letter in which Marvin O'Quinn, then-president and chief executive of the Jackson Health System, which runs Jackson Memorial, warned Dr. Goldschmidt about the legal risks of submitting claims for patient care that should be covered by a medical study.

The current director of compliance at Jackson Health System, Diana Salinas, said the allegations are a matter of investigation by the two federal agencies. Ms. Shalala and Dr. Goldschmidt told The Chronicle that they were unfamiliar with the matter. 'This must not be a very big issue,' Ms. Shalala said, 'because none of the Jackson senior leadership has ever brought it up with me.'

Finally,

And the departing chief executive of the Jackson Health System, Eneida O. Roldan, whose appointment two years ago was supported by the university, said medical-school officials made clear from the start 'that they were going to take cardiology across the street.'

Ms. Dixon-Shim, of the support-workers' union, is among those who say they've seen it happen. 'Most of the indigent patients, they're staying at Jackson,' she says. 'But most of the private patients, the physicians are taking them over to their area' at the university-owned hospitals.

Note that we previously discussed how Jackson's financial troubles lead to a bid by for-profit Steward Health Care to take it over.

Summary

So, through her mutiple roles that allowed her to serve at several key nodes of networks of influence in health care, one person has been linked to multiple dysfunctional aspects of US health care that arguably have been responsible for our increasing costs, declining access, and poor quality.  Note that these multiple roles seem to have been logically and even ideologically inconsistent, suggesting that multiplying her roles within the  networks may have been more compelling to her than logical or ideological rationales for particular actions.

We have discussed before, the leadership of health care organizations has become incredibly interrelated, interlocked, and incestuous. It appears that top leaders of various health care organizations may be more familiar with and identify more with each other, and with other hired executives and managers, than with their organizations, their organizations' missions, and their organizations' professionals, staff, students, clients, and patients.  It now appears reasonable to characterize the relationships among health care leaders as embedded networks of influence. 


So to repeat- I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships. A few bloggers cannot do it all. Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders. However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

BLOGSCAN - Care and Feeding of Key Opinion Leaders

On the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog, Dr Howard Brody looked further into how cultivating "key opinion leaders" has now been industrialized.  Given how many key opinion leaders have vigorously defended their intellectual independence despite the marketing money lavished upon them, I wonder how any who happen upon such evidence of how they are regarded as "targets" for marketers would react?  But I suspect most key opinion leaders would do their best not to happen upon such evidence

"I'm Not Here to Sell Drugs" - Then Why Use Company Provided "Correct" Slides?

In October, 2010, we discussed a series of reports by Pro Publica and multiple other respected news organizations about payments by seven pharmaceutical companies to thousands of doctors.  Industry often claims that they only pay the best and the brightest physicians and academics to provide education relevant to their products.  However, the ProPublica et al report suggested that they mainly recruited physicians who already showed their favor to their products by prescribing them often, but soothed their consciences by dubbing them "thought leaders" or "key opinion leaders."  While some of the physicians were well-known academics, others had notably blemished records. 

Since then, news media around the US have looked into interactions among local physicians and academic medical institutions and the seven pharmaceutical companies.  In November, 2010, here we discussed cases that suggested that pharmaceutical companies like physician speakers because they are more "believable" than pharmaceutical representatives, and choose physicians who already are prolific prescribers of the drug to be promoted, and that suggested that some physicians realized that speaking for pharmaceutical companies influenced their own prescribing.

Since then, more investigations of local physicians' interactions with pharmaceutical companies have appeared that reinforced contrasts between rationalizations that physicians and drug companies use to support continued payments for "drug talks," and what these talks are really about.

"Leaders in Their Field" vs Sanctions and Crimes

 Many pharmaceutical (and other health care corporations) have repeated the mantra that the physicians they hire to give talks are the best and the brightest.  The physicians who give the talks sometimes get to believe this.  For example, a ProPublica follow-up report[1] on discrepancies between data the pharmaceutical companies put on the web and gave to state regulators noted:

Pfizer, for example, told the state it paid Dr. Randy Schapiro $1,770 last year. But on the firm’s website, it reported spending $43,827 on him in the second half of 2009 alone.

It then quoted Dr Schapiro:

Schapiro said the doctors paid by pharmaceutical companies are 'leaders in their fields,' and patients should want to see their physician among them. 'If their doctor is not on the list,' he said, 'maybe they should look for a different doctor.'

On the other hand, several of the local news articles focused on physicians who were paid drug company speakers despite having chequered backgrounds, shall we say. In the Elmira Star Gazette[2]:

Tulio Ortega, a Rochester psychiatrist who made $144,548 from Eli Lilly and AstraZeneca for speaking to groups of peers during the last two years - was put of [sic] probation for two years in 2008 and ordered to pay a $7,500 fine after being sanctioned for negligence and incompetence.

Also,

Lilly also paid Yonkers physician Ali Sherzoy $4,334 in the first two quarter of this year, even though he had his license suspended in New York and New Jersey earlier this year after pleading guilty to a count of criminal sexual contact in 2008.

Sherzoy told ProPublica the incident involted his family's nanny and had nothing to do with his ability to practice medicine.

Other New York doctors were sanctioned for incidents ranging from deficiencies in handling controlled substances to being convicted of tax evasion.

Another article by the same author[3] noted two more cases:

In 1991, Johnson City doctor Louis Mateya was charged with professional misconduct after a 22-year-old woman accused him of unzipping his pants and fondling himself during an examination.

Mateya admitted guilt to the charge. The State Board for Professional Medical Conduct suspended his license for two months, followed by a 58-month probationary period, during which he was monitored by a psychiatrist and a health professional selected by the board.

During the last nine months of 2009, GlaxoSmithKline paid Mateya, an internist at United Health Services, $1,750 to speak on behalf of Lovaza, Glaxo's prescription omega 3 fish oil, according to an e-mail from a United Health Services spokeswoman.

Also,

A second Southern Tier physician, Robert Douenias, of Corning, was also paid by Glaxo: $20,000 during the same time frame to deliver speeches, even though he received sanctions in 1992.

According to the Office for Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC) records, Douenias lied about a previous criminal conviction on his application for a New York medical license. He received a censure and reprimand from the OPMC, was ordered to perform 200 hours of public service and was placed on probation for two years. Douenias said on his application he had never been convicted of a crime in any state or country, even though he had a previous conviction, according to OPMC records.

Note that the original ProPublica reporting from their database emphasized cases of physicians paid to speak by pharmaceutical companies who also had been sanctioned by medical boards or the criminal justice system (see post here).

Although drug marketers like to tell physicians they are selected as "thought leaders" because of their brilliance, it appears that the selection of such "key opinion leaders" is not necessarily based on sterling character.

"I'm Not There to Sell a Drug," But Then Why Use the Company's Slides?

A number of the reports featured physicians who asserted their independence, at least from marketing goals. 

For example, as reported by the Duluth (MN) News Tribune[4],

A Duluth psychiatrist has received more than $525,000 since 2002 in payments from pharmaceutical companies, far more than any other Northland doctor, an analysis by the News Tribune shows.

Dr. Tracy Tomac of St. Luke’s hospital was paid by the companies to give presentations on health and drug issues.

Furthermore,

'I’m there as an educator and resource,' she said. 'I’m not in business to do a sales pitch. I’m not a salesperson.'

Also,

In 2007, [Dr] Tomac said her presentations included content that was screened and approved by the FDA,....

However, other reporting suggested that content "screened and approved by the FDA" was content provided by the pharmaceutical companies.

For example, The Tennessean noted[5]:

Dr. Jan Brandes heads the Nashville Neuroscience Group, a clinic that's now part of Nashville-based Saint Thomas Health Services. She made $111,150 in outside income over the past two years, largely in speaker fees paid by drug company GlaxoSmithKline, which markets a wide array of brand-name drugs, literally from A to Z.

Dr Brandes also asserted,

'The real point is I'm not there to sell a drug,' Brandes said. 'I'm there to interpret trial results, talk about disease states and help physicians understand where this research might fit in the context of their practice.'

However,

Most drug companies now require physicians to use the company's slides and presentations if they pay them to speak at an event. The industry says that is to ensure that all U.S. Food and Drug Administration rules are met and that physicians don't wander off into discussing uses for a particular product that haven't been approved by regulators.

Also, an article in the Alexandria (VA) Gazette Packet[6] noted:

Whistleblower lawsuits filed in recent years have accused firms of using doctors to push pills for unapproved uses during dinnertime talks, prompting at least 10 firms to settle cases for nearly $7 billion in the last three years. Since that time, pharmaceutical companies have tightened control over what happens during presentations given on their dime. Last year, for example, GlaxoSmithKline instituted a new policy prohibiting doctors from using their own slides during presentations. Starting in 2010, all doctors giving speeches sponsored by GlaxoSmithKline must use slides presented by the pharmaceutical company in the order specified.

'We want to make sure that everything is correct,' said Mary Anne Rhyne, a spokeswoman for GlaxoSmithKline. 'The best way to do that is to have our team prepare the slide.'

Note that Dr Brandes above was paid mainly by GlaxoSmithKline, who presumably also provided all her slides and made sure that everything she said was "correct," at least in terms of what GlaxoSmithKline thought was correct.

And one more example per MyFoxAtlanta[7]:

Some of Georgia's highest paid physicians? .... and Roswell psychiatrist Dr. Michael Banov: over $68,000, also from Lilly.

Dr Banov asserted:

We don't sell medications. We simply educate physicians about data, and they make their own mind up.

However,

Banov says, the drug company - not him - creates the materials used in his speeches, and he says there's a reason for that.

'We are only able to present the data. We're not able to present our personal opinions. Our personal preferences, how we use the medication off label. any of that. So we're held to a very tight standard by the FDA,' said Banov.

Drug companies may say they make their paid physician speakers use slides provided by the company to prevent them from talking about "off-label" uses.  However, there is no reason for a physician-educator not to talk about "off-label" uses, and physicians can prescribe any legal drug for whatever purpose they see fit, whether or not the drug is on or "off label." 

But drug companies are prohibited by law from promoting off-label uses.  Requiring physicians to use drug companies' slides and preventing them from talking about "off-label" uses demonstrates that the physicians are functioning as marketers, not educators. 

Summary

As local reporters look into more cases, it becomes increasingly clear that up to now, pharmaceutical companies have been none too fussy about which physicians they pay to speak about their products. It is self-serving, but inaccurate for both sets of parties to assert that the companies choose only the "best and the brightest." 

Furthermore, it has now become glaringly obvious that the purpose of "drug talks" is, well, to sell drugs.  Some physicians paid by drug companies to speak may bluster about their independence, but if they are using company provided slides, who can deny they are influenced  by the company.  Furthermore, when companies insist not merely on providing slides, but on ensuring that "everything is correct," then it is clear that it is the companies' talks that the physicians are giving.  Physicians giving company talks cannot be speaking independently, and hence must be regarded as company sales personnel, whose disguises as independent doctors or medical academics are now in tatters.

Doctors who still choose to go to "drug talks" should have no illusions that they are being exposed to anything other than marketing.  Thus, I urge my colleagues to forgo the nice meals and the company prepared "correct" slides, and spend the time trying to more critically assess the clinical evidence. 

References


1.  Ornstein C, Weber T. In Minnesota, drug company reports of payments to doctors arrive riddled with mistakes.  ProPublica, Dec 10, 2010.  Link here.
2. Hunter J. Rochester psychiatrist, sanctioned for incompetence, made $144K from drug companies. Elmira Star-Gazette, Dec 4, 2010.
3. Hunter J. Despite sanctions, physicians hired as drug company pitchmen. PressConnects.com, Dec 4, 2010. Link here.
4. Stahl B. Duluth doctor denies payments from drug companies sway decisions.  Duluth News Tribune, Dec 20, 2010.  Link here.
5. Ward G. They say they prescribe based on patients, not Big Pharma. Tennessean, Dec 19, 2010. Link here.
6. Pope ML. Conflict of interest? - Alexandria doctors receive thousands of dollars from Big Pharma.  Alexandia Gazette Packet, Jan 13, 2010.  Link here.
7. Galvin B. Health watch: doctors and drug companies. MyFoxAtlanta, Dec 29, 2010. Link here.

KOL Phollywood

I have wondered many times about the proliferating offers I've received in increasing numbers in recent years for medical symposia, talks, conferences, etc. that appear either subtly or overtly geared to promote some treatment or product for a disease area.

Roy Poses' post "Key Opinion Leader Services Companies: the Creation of Useful Idiots and Usefully Idiotic Organization" would appear to help explain this phenomenon.

Worse:

At my Aug. 2009 post "Has Ghostwriting Infected The Experts With Tainted Knowledge, Creating Vectors for Further Spread and Mutation of the Scientific Knowledge Base?" here I wrote:

... Will we ever be able to peel back all the layers of the ghostwriting onion to get to the core of impartial and objective scientific articles related to drugs and medical devices? Perhaps not, but the practice must stop going forward.

Tainted literature creates tainted scientific knowledge, the carriers of which may then further taint the knowledge base (with the best of intentions and with firm belief in the fairness and accuracy of their activities, of course).

Practitioners of evidence-based medicine may be unwittingly practicing "evidence-tainted medicine", or "pseudo-evidence based medicine" as described by others on this blog.

We now learn that an entire industry exists to identify, catalog, index social networks, and do other data mining to quantify "KOL suitability factors", and then interact with pharma and surely other healthcare sectors to launch and "nurture" people so identified, as Hollywood might do to identify actors for a movie. It thus seems the situation with regard to medical science might be even worse than I thought.

I ask:

• Can we ever fully trust information given at medical presentations, especially by "popular", even well-published physicians any more?

• Can we truly trust any medical literature, period?

Even worse - do pharmas and other healthcare sectors use these services not just to identify what might be called "positive" KOLS to be seduced and romanced and deployed to spread the company's charms, but also to identify "negative" KOLs (with messages not to the liking of the industry) to be marginalized?

Finally, I coin a new term for this circle jerk of pharma KOL 'services companies' (a.k.a. KOL peddlers), KOL handlers and KOL promoters:

"Phollywood."

-- SS

Jan 12, 2011 addendum:

See the post "A Massive Cynical Effort" at the blog of 1BoringOldMan for interesting observations about these issues.

Key Opinion Leader Services Companies: the Creation of Useful Idiots and Usefully Idiotic Organizations

In researching the conflicts of interest of the University of California "36," I stumbled upon a fascinating corner of the pharmaceutical/ biotechnology/ medical device marketing universe, the companies that find and manage key opinion leaders (KOLs), also known as "thought leaders."  Reviewing their own marketing materials reveals how KOLs truly are health care corporate marketing's useful idiots.

I found three companies which seem entirely devoted to the adoption, care and feeding of KOLs, plus numerous companies, including some medical education and communication companies (MECCs) that provide KOL-related products and services.  I will first describe the companies briefly, then draw upon their marketing materials to underline what KOLs are really about.

Leadership in Medicine Inc

This is the company I found first, because one of its directors is a member of the UC 36, the group of top university leaders who threatened to sue the university to increase their already generous pensions.

Leadership in Medicine Inc's web-site describes its reason for being thus:

IF YOU NEED TO KNOW who are the most prominent, admired, and influential actors in healthcare, how they are interconnected, and why, you need our expertise.

Given how vastly complex are the relationships among providers, researchers, and other significant actors in healthcare, it is vital to focus on key opinion leaders (KOLs) at local, regional, and global levels, and to understand the ties among them.

Its clients are:

Over 80 client companies
* All of the top 15 largest pharmaceuticals
* 8 of the 10 largest biotechs
* 5 of the 10 largest medical device companies

A graphic on its "experience" page listed the following companies: Baxter, Wyeth, Lilly, Roche, Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, Abbott Laboratories, Genzyme, Bristol-Myers-Squibb, Medtronic, Johnson and Johnson, Genentech, and Covidien.

KOL LLC

Company description:

As our name implies, we are a company devoted to providing Key Opinion Leader software and Key Opinion Leader Management services for pharmaceutical, biotechnology and device companies.

The company's graphic client list included: Cephalon, Scios, Novartis, Schering-Plough King Pharmaceuticals, Pfizer, Genentech, Reliant Pharmaceuticals, McNeil (division of Johnson and Johnson, Jazz Pharmaceuticals, Endo Pharmaceuticals, Cytogen, Health Products Research, Shire, Reckitt Benckiser, Protein Design Labs, and Odyssey Pharmaceuticals.

Thought Leader Select

The relevant parts of the company description:

Thought Leader Select is a Chapel Hill, NC-based private research and consulting firm serving the biopharmaceutical and healthcare industries.

and

We serve these industries and the medical community at large by assessing medical experts (known as 'thought leaders' and 'key opinion leaders')....

Perusal of the materials used by these companies, and other companies which market KOL or thought leader related services makes the nature of the relationship between KOLs and commercial health care firms, and the purpose of employing KOLs clear.

KOLs are Employed by Marketing Departments to do Marketing

The best example comes from a description of a KOL information technology application sold by Nagarro:

A web-based application was developed by Nagarro to help the marketing department of a global pharmaceutical company exploit Key Opinion Leader (KOL) information in order to promote products and remain ahead of its competition.

Problem Description

In today s fast-paced competitive environment, pharmaceutical companies cannot solely rely on superior products to succeed. Well organized marketing departments help sales departments reach goals and give companies an edge over competition, but without access to valuable resources, like KOLs, they are ineffective. KOLs influence the medical community and ultimately the end users of pharmaceutical products.

Pharmaceutical companies that are able to identify and work with KOLs will be better positioned to compete....

Benefits

[include]
Creation of market intelligence from highly specialized and customizable reports containing previously unavailable aggregate data....

Ability to group KOLs by product knowledge and associations in order to better promote products

Ability to maximize ROI from KOL related events

Enhanced sales and marketing productivity through streamlining of complex multi-source information

That makes it crystal clear that marketers use KOLs to market, to sell products. While at times KOLs might actually be used to advise health care corporations about clinical or scientific issues, that is hardly their major point. KOLs are almost always hired to market by marketing departments.

In case someone might argue that this is only one example, let us look at materials from the other companies.

KOL LLC described the usefulness of KOLs thus:

Everyone recognizes the value of opinion leaders (OL), or thought leaders. While national level OLs may not write many prescriptions they influence thousands of prescribers and hence prescriptions through their research, lectures, publications and their participation on advisory boards, committees, editorial boards, professional societies and guidelines/consensus document development. Regional level OLs are often involved in state societies or legislative initiatives in addition to their speaking and publications. While local level OLs may not publish, they provide advice to local colleagues and may speak at grand rounds. And who are the ‘rising stars’ in your therapeutic area?

It is imperative that you know the OLs in your market at a national, regional and local influence level as well as those ‘rising stars’.

This is a bit more indirect, but it is clear that the goal is to "influence prescribers" to prescribe, not provide scientific or clinical advice to the company.

Leadership in Medicine Inc's materials also continually emphasized the point of KOLs is to influence, for example, they boasted of pioneering analyses "to assess paths of influence in healthcare," developed a particular tool called "Centrality Ranking" to "provide fine-grained ratings of KOLs' influence," and claimed to "have identified, profiled, and mapped the influence of tens of thousands of individual KOLs...." The clear implication is that KOLs' influence is the central consideration, and what else is this influence good for other than to sell products, and perhaps advocate for corporations in general?

When KOLs are Involved, Many Activities that Appear to be Educational or Scientific Really Are For Marketing

Strikingly, KOL LLC claimed its role in guideline development:

Guidelines produced by national societies are optimal, but often can be a slow, painful and expensive process to develop. KOL, L.L.C. can provide a faster alternative. We have experience convening a panel of experts in a therapeutic area. We serve a project management role to ensure the timelines and deliverables are met. We have access to a medical writing team of 25 healthcare professionals who can write the initial drafts, as our experience tells us it is easier for experts to edit, than to write from scratch.

There has been growing realization that guidelines may be biased by commercial sponsorship and by the participation by individuals with conflicts of interest. The KOL LLC marketing materials suggest, however, that guidelines have become purpose-built marketing vehicles through the participation of selected KOLs with allegiances to drug, device and biotechnology companies. As an aside, note that guideline-development services includes the participation of a team of ghost-writers who will write the first drafts, a function that naive academics might have thought should be that of clinical and scientific experts.

For another example, KOL LLC asserted it could manage "investigator meetings," :

We’ll help you better plan to maximize the communication of the trial results through targeted abstracts, posters, publications and lectures.

so

Due to the time constraints placed on Clinical Research Departments, many times ‘research mills’ are selected as the trial sites. This is fine, but who is going to publish the results and stand up and present the results at national, regional and local meetings. We can provide you advice and counsel about how to involve your KOLs effectively, while maintaining your aggressive timelines.

The goal of KOL management here is for the company to control how the research is disseminated. Note also the cynical view of "research mills," which likely refers to contract research organizations. Do we really think that CROs are used by commercial firms because they do better research?

Key Leading Organizations

A bonus from reading through the offerings on KOL management was to discover another related business that has not been subject of polite conversation before. Leadership in Medicine Inc put it this way:

Equally essential is recognizing the roles played by key leading organizations (KLOs) such as medical institutions, payers, professional organizations, patient groups, government entities, and journals in structuring KOL activities and relationships, since those are the stages on which KOLs perform.

Key Leading Organizations (KLOs) apparently include influential organizations, e.g., academic medical institutions, medical societies, and patient advocacy groups that can be deliberately turned into organizations of useful idiots for marketing purposes. Note that we and others have discussed how institutional conflicts of interest and conflicts of interest affecting leaders of of such organizations can lead to bias in favor of commercial interests. But what Leadership in Medicine Inc has written suggests that such organizations can be deliberately taken over to function as industry's fellow travelers.

Similarly, Thought Leader Select advertised services to manage organizations to support "thought leadership":

Through Centers, all of our research and assessment skills culminate in our evaluation of universities, influential clinics, and research foundations for a holistic approach to thought leadership in the medical community. With centers of excellence assessments we take a drill-down approach, starting at the academic medical centers, then moving into affiliated hospitals and clinics....

Summary

Industry spokespeople and key opinion leaders tout themselves as clinical, educational, and/or scientific experts chosen for their expertise to advance medicine, science and public health.  There are documented instances (e.g., see posts here and here) in which defectors from marketing departments of commercial health care corporations described KOLs as salespeople who could be more influential hidden within their professional or academic cloaks.  Even some physicians paid to be speakers on behalf of pharmaceutical corporations have acknowledged their role as salespeople in fancy dress (see post here).  There are cases of documents revealed by discovery in legal actions that show how companies planned organized stealth marketing efforts for drugs that included activities by KOLs (e.g., see post here about marketing of Lexapro, and here about Neurontin).

However, the marketing materials used by KOL service companies (for lack of a better name) show that KOLs are largely meant to be stealth marketers, and hired for that purpose, that KOLs participate as marketers in the sorts of activities that to the naive appear to be educational or scientific, and that marketers try to recruit whole organizations, such as medical schools, research organizations, medical societies, and patient advocacy groups as disguised sales organizations.

This goes beyond the problem of bias of physicians, or individual health professionals due to their financial relationships.  It goes beyond the problem of bias of organizations due to their sources of financial support or the financial relationships of their leaders.  It looks like there has been a massive campaign by health care corporate marketers to make useful idiots out of possibly a majority of medical academics and academic, professional, and supposedly patient-centered organizations.  This appears to be a massive, cynical effort to hollow out our once respected health care institutions and professionals in the service of marketing.

A final word to any individuals reading this who are paid by corporate marketers to be KOLs.  If you think that you are paid for educational or scientific purposes, you likely have been made into a chump.  The people who did this to you were likely not acting in your best interests, or those of society, but to cynically market their product and increase their own earnings.  If you doubt this, look at the materials cited above.  You really don't want to continue being chumps, do you?